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INTRODUCITON

On its face, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) attempts
to provide a straightforward rule governing the rights of the debtor
and the secured party when the debtor disposes of some or all of the
secured party's collateral. Under U.C.C. section 9-306, the secured
party not only maintains its security interest in the collateral
following disposition, but also obtains a security interest in any
identifiable proceeds of the collateral.' Within the definition of
"proceeds," the U.C.C. includes anything received upon the "sale,
exchange, collection or other disposition of' the collateral.2 This
continuing proceeds coverage is a default rule; under Section 9203(3), the secured party automatically obtains continuing coverage
against proceeds unless the security agreement specifies otherwise.
Through these provisions, the U.C.C. seeks to achieve efficiency in
secured transactions by codifying the ex ante bargain of the
hypothetical reasonable debtor and secured party, who would expect
the secured party's lien to continue against whatever property the
debtor receives upon disposition of the collateral.
Despite the drafters' functional scheme, however, judicial
interpretation of Section 9-306(1)'s proceeds coverage has been
anything but straightforward. During the thirty-plus years following
the adoption of Article 9, opportunistic debtors and bankruptcy
1.
U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1990) ("Except where this Article otherwise provides, a
security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition
thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement
or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received

by the debtor.").
2.
3.
4.

Id. § 9-306(1).
Id. § 9-203(3).
As Professor Hawkland has stated:

[The U.C.C.] automatically gives the parties a right to collateral (proceeds) that is
usually bargained for even in those cases in which the parties have forgotten to
implement their bargain by appropriate language in the security agreement. In the
unusual case in which the parties do not want proceeds included as part of the
collateral, they have the option of excluding it .... Efficiency is promoted ...
because the parties must act affirmatively only in unusual cases ....
William D. Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the U.C.C. Part II.
Proceeds,77 COM. L.J. 12, 16 (1972); see also REviEw CoMMrrrEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PERMANENT EDroRIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT 63 (1971) ("[C]laims to proceeds under Section 9-306
do not require a statement in the security agreement, for it is assumed that the parties so
intend unless othenvise agreed." (emphasis added)).
HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 647 1994-1995
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trustees, eager to find unencumbered funds to finance a reorganization
or to pay administrative expenses, have urged courts to construe
Section 9-306(1)'s definition of proceeds narrowly. Debtors and
bankruptcy trustees have raised this interpretive issue in a variety of
contexts, as shown by the following examples:
* Debtor owns a car subject to a security interest in favor of Secured
Party. Following Debtor's bankruptcy, the car is destroyed by an
insured casualty. Upon receiving the insurance moneys, Trustee argues
that Secured Party has no lien upon those funds because there
5 has been
car.
the
of
disposition
other
or
collection,
exchange,
sale,
no
* Debtor owns a machine subject to a security interest in favor of
Secured Party. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, Debtor had leased the
machine to Lessee for $500 per month. During bankruptcy, Debtor
argues that the lease rentals do not constitute Secured Party's cash
collateral because there has6been no sale, exchange, collection, or other
disposition of the machine.
o Debtor owns 500 shares of stock in ABC Company, subject to a
security interest in favor of Secured Party. Following Debtor's
bankruptcy, ABC Co. pays a cash dividend of $1 per share. Trustee
seeks to use the cash dividend to pay administrative expenses, arguing
that the funds do not constitute Secured Party's cash collateral because
there has been no disposition of the stock.7
* Debtor borrows $10,000 from Secured Party and grants Secured
Party a security interest in its upcoming corn crop. Instead of planting
the crop, Debtor signs a payment-in-kind (PIK) contract and receives a
government subsidy, in the form of PIK certificates, for agreeing not to
plant com. After Debtor's bankruptcy, Trustee argues that the PIK
certificates are unencumbered because they are not proceeds of
Debtor's crops, since there was no disposition of Debtor's crops.8
In each of these examples, the disputed asset represents a return
of the economic value or productive capacity of the bargained-for
collateral. Thus, in each case Secured Party can argue persuasively
that the Debtor received the disputed funds upon a disposition of
collateral within the meaning of Section 9-306(1). 9 Nevertheless,
because the language of Section 9-306(1) is not perfectly suited to this
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra part II.B.1.
See infra part HI.B.2.
See infra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
See infra part HI.A.1.
See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1990).
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expansive interpretation, many courts have construed it in a narrow,
formalistic fashion that severely limits the scope of the term
"proceeds." For example, some courts have construed Section 9306(1) using a "passage of title" conception of proceeds, which refuses
to treat an asset as proceeds unless the debtor has permanently
disposed of title to the underlying collateral.10
Under this
interpretation, sums such as casualty insurance proceeds and lease
rentals would not constitute proceeds of the secured party's collateral
when the collateral was damaged or leased. In addition, courts have
often construed Section 9-306(1) to exclude sums from constituting
proceeds when the bargained-for collateral never came into
existence. 2 Under this interpretation, which is referred to in this
Article as the "nonexistent collateral" problem, sums such as
agricultural subsidies paid to a debtor not to plant a particular crop
would not constitute proceeds of the crops that the debtor previously
pledged to the secured party as collateral. 3
Not every court has accepted such narrow constructions of
Section 9-306; therefore, the judicial debate has yielded a hodgepodge
of inconsistent opinions that has prevented the term "proceeds" from
acquiring a coherent meaning and scope. In addition to the costs of
nonuniformity that arise whenever different courts interpret a statute
inconsistently, the lack of a coherent definition of proceeds has
impeded the U.C.C.'s ability to implement its underlying policy of
facilitating efficiency in commercial transactions. As Professor
Thomas Quinn has noted, "[T]he slick language of 9-306 covers so
vast an assortment of factually different and complex problems that
generalization and simplifications are fraught with peculiar risks. 1 4
The time is ripe for careful reanalysis of the scope of the term
"proceeds" under Section 9-306(1). In 1990, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the American
Law Institute (ALI), and the Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C.
(PEB) established a committee to study whether Article 9 needed

10. See infra part II.A.
11. See infra part I.B.
12. See infra partllI.A.
13. See infra part M.A.1.
14. 2 THoMAS M. QUINN, QUINN's UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND
LAw DIGEST I 9-306[A], at 9-293 (2d ed. 1991).
HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 649 1994-1995
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revision. 15 In late 1992, this study committee issued its report (the
PEB Report), stating that while Article 9 was conceptually sound, the
system of commercial transactions would still benefit from a
comprehensive revision.16
Pursuant to this recommendation,
NCCUSL and ALI appointed a drafting committee17 (the Drafting
Committee) that has already begun its work. This revision process
provides an ideal opportunity for the Drafting Committee to develop
and implement a coherent conception of the term "proceeds" that
reflects its proper scope.
This Article provides a careful analysis of the proper scope of the
term "proceeds" under Section 9-306. Parts II and III develop a
coherent conception of the term "proceeds" by focusing upon the
proper interpretation of Section 9-306 in its current form. Part II
evaluates the passage of title conception of proceeds in light of the
1972 and 1987 amendments to Article 9 and demonstrates that this
conception is fundamentally inconsistent with the economic, valuebased conception of proceeds that emerges from those amendments.
Using this emerging conception of proceeds, which focuses upon the
occurrence of an event that exhausts or consumes the collateral's
economic value or productive capacity, Part II demonstrates the correct
interpretation of Section 9-306(1) in cases involving casualty
insurance proceeds, lease rentals, stock dividends, and tort settlements.
In Part Ia the Article examines the nonexistent collateral problem and
demonstrates that it is a formalistic, outmoded concept that both
frustrates the ex ante bargain of the reasonable debtor and secured
party and fails to give effect to the emerging value-based conception of
the term "proceeds." Part III further demonstrates the correct
interpretation of the current Section 9-306(1) in cases involving
government agricultural subsidy payments and business interruption
insurance payments.
In Part IV, the Article shifts its focus toward the need to revise
Section 9-306 to express a clear, coherent definition of proceeds that is
consistent with the emerging value-based conception of that term. Part
IV begins by reviewing and evaluating the recommendations of the
15. PERMANENT EDrrORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB
STUDY GRouP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARnCLE 9 at 1 (1992) [hereinafter PEB
REPORT].
16.
17.

Id. at 6.
Id.at 18.

HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 650 1994-1995

1995]

U. C.C. SECTION 9-306

PEB Report concerning Section 9-306 and the scope of the term
"proceeds." The Article criticizes two specific problems with the PEB
Report's recommendations. First, in an attempt to identify the
standards for what constitutes proceeds, the PEB Reportidentified two
ostensibly different conceptions of proceeds:
"exchange and
replacement" proceeds and "close association" proceeds. Part IV
criticizes this dichotomy, which makes it appear that there is no
unifying conception to provide a basis for defining the term
"proceeds." Instead, as Part IV argues, the definition should be based
upon one unified conception-that the term "proceeds" includes any
asset received as a consequence of some event that consumes a portion
of the bargained-for collateral's economic value or productive capacity.
Second, in an attempt to limit the scope of the term "proceeds,"
the PEB Report asserted that certain assets were too attenuated to
constitute proceeds even though a debtor received them by virtue of
events that resulted in a diminution of the collateral's value.18 As Part
IV demonstrates, this attempted qualification places an incoherent and
economically unjustified restraint upon the term "proceeds." Further,
the PEB Report confuses the question of whether an asset constitutes
proceeds of collateral with the question of whether a security interest
continues against that asset. Instead of encouraging courts to place
unjustified limitations upon the scope of the term "proceeds," the
Drafting Committee should instead direct courts to focus upon the
identifiability of proceeds as the key to the secured party's ability to
obtain continuing proceeds coverage under Section 9-306. The Article
concludes with an appendix setting forth proposed statutory language
and commentary for the Drafting Committee's consideration as it
revises Section 9-306.

18.

For example, the study committee asserted that accounts generated by a

construction contractor "should not be considered proceeds of the contractor's construction
equipment, even though the equipment depreciates as a result of its use in generating the
accounts." Id. at 111 n.16.
HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 651 1994-1995

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

I

THE EMERGING TRUE SCOPE OF PROCEEDS AND TBE EFFECT OF
"PASSAGE OF TITLE"

A.

JudicialReliance upon Passageof Title as the Key to
Classification:An Introduction

Before classifying an asset as proceeds of collateral, one first
must interpret Section 9-306(1)'s definition of proceeds. Most of the
terms in that definition are transactional (e.g., "sale," "exchange,"
and "collection"), and several (e.g., "sale" and "exchange")
obviously contemplate a transfer of legal title to the collateral. 9
Accordingly, one might construe Section 9-306(1) as expressing a
passage of title conception of proceeds, requiring the debtor to have
transferred complete title to the collateral in order to classify an asset
as proceeds of the collateral.
In fact, most courts have used this passage of title concept as the
key to classification under Section 9-306(1). An excellent example of
this approach is the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in In re Hastie.20 In 1981, John Douglas Hastie
borrowed $750,000 from First National Bank and Trust Company of
Oklahoma City (First National Bank), to which Hastie granted a
security interest in 248 shares of stock of FirstBank Holding Company
(FirstBank).2' The security agreement provided:
The Debtor hereby sells, assigns, transfers and conveys ... a Security
interest in and to all of the Debtor's interest and property rights, ....
including, without limitation, all moneys and claims for moneys due
and to become due to the Debtor under all dividends, distributions,
accounts, contract rights, voting rights and general intangibles relating
to and/or due from [FirstBank] ....
... The Secured Party will have the right to receive from
[FirstBank] the share of dividends, profits, return of contributions
and
22
other distributions to which the debtor would be entitled.
Subsequently, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
succeeded to the interest of First National Bank.21 While the FDIC
19.
20..
21.
E3d 1042
22.
23.

See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1990).
2 E3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993).
Brief in Chief of Appellant, Acquisition Management, Inc. at 3, In re Hastie, 2
(10th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-6034).
Hastie,2 F3d at 1043-44 n.1 (alterations in original).
Appellant's Brief at 3, Hastie (No. 92-6034).
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maintained possession of the stock certificates, thereby perfecting its
security interest in the stock under Oklahoma law,24 the FDIC never
requested that FirstBank register a change of the stock's ownership.25
Therefore, at all relevant times, Hastie continued to be listed as the
registered owner of the FirstBank stock.26
On October 12, 1988, Hastie filed a voluntary Chapter 11
petition.27 During the bankruptcy, FirstBank paid cash dividends on
three different occasions, pursuant to which Hastie received a total of
$130,317.91.28 When the FDIC asserted a lien against those dividends
under its security agreement, Hastie filed an adversary proceeding
seeking a declaration that the FDIC 9 had no effective security interest
against the dividends. The bankruptcy court granted summary
judgment for Hastie, holding that FDIC failed to perfect its security
interest in the dividends.30 The district court adopted the bankruptcy
court's opinion and affirmed.3 On appeal, the FDIC argued that its
security interest in the dividends remained unaffected by Hastie's
bankruptcy filing, since the dividends constituted proceeds of the stock
32
under Section 9-306(1) and Bankruptcy Code section 552(b).
24. See OKL.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 8-321(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1994); see also
Hastie,2 R3d at 1044.
25. Hastie,2 F.3d at 1044.
26. Id.
27. Appellant's Brief at 3, Hastie (No. 92-6034).
28. Id.
29. During the litigation, Acquisition Management, FDIC's successor in interest
with respect to the FirstBank stock, was substituted as a party plaintiff. Appellant's Brief
app. at 106, Hastie (No. 92-6034). For ease of understanding, however, both the bankruptcy
court and the Tenth Circuit continued to identify the FDIC as the secured party in their
opinions. See generallyHastie,2 F.3d 1042.
30. In re Hastie, No. 90-0230-LN, slip op. at 9 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 29, 1991),
reprintedin Appellant's Brief app. at 98, Hastie (No. 92-6034). The court stated that:
At any time prior to the filing of debtor's petition herein, FDIC could have
caused the record ownership of the [FirstBank] Stock to be transferred to it,
thereby assuring under UCC § 8-207(1) that it would receive any notifications or
dividends to which the registered owner would be entitled .... It did not do so.
Id. (footnote omitted).
31. Appellant's Brief app. at 89, Hastie (No. 92-6034).
32. Hastie, 2 F.3d at 1044. At the time of the Hastie decision, Section 552(b)
provided:
[I]f the debtor and [the secured party] entered into a security agreement before the
commencement of the case and if the security interest created by such security
agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the commencement
of the case and to proceeds,product, offspring, rents, orprofits of such property,
then such security interest extends to such proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or
HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 653 1994-1995
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The Tenth Circuit rejected the FDIC's argument. 3 In analyzing
whether the dividends were proceeds of the FirstBank stock, the court
first focused upon the transactional nature of -Section 9-306(1)'s
definition of the term "proceeds":
With respect to this definition, the term "sale" may be defined
generally as "[a] revenue transaction where goods or services are
delivered to a customer in return for cash or a contractual obligation to
pay. [The] [t]erm comprehends [a] transfer of property from one party
to another for valuable recompense." Similarly, the term "exchange"
may be defined as "[the] [a]ct of giving or taking one thing for
another," and the term "collect" in the context of a debt or claim may
be defined as "payment or liquidation of it." Lastly, the phrase "other
disposition" may be defined generally as the "[a]ct of disposing; [or]
transferring to the care or possession of another; [or] [t]he parting with,
alienation of, or giving up [of] property." Accordingly, each of the
one asset is disposed of
foregoing events describes an event whereby
34
and another is acquired as its substitute.
Based upon the transactional focus of this definition, the Tenth
Circuit extrapolated that characterization of an asset as proceeds
required passage of title to the collateral:
The receipt of cash dividends by a registered owner of certificated
securities bears no resemblance to the events specified in the definition
of proceeds or to an act of disposition generally... [A]lthough the
cash dividend distributes assets of the corporation, it does not alter the
ownership interest represented by the stock. The cash dividend,
therefore, is not a disposition of the stock. Normally, stock is not
disposed of, sold, or exchanged in any way unless a change in the
ownership interest in the issuing corporation is thereby effected.3 5
Since Hastie owned 248 shares before and after receipt of the
dividends, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the dividends did not

profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the extent
provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law....
11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Congress recently amended Bankruptcy Code
Section 552(b) in Section 214 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 5116, 140
CONG. REc. H10752 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994). For the language of Section 552(b), as

amended, see infra note 218 and accompanying text.
33. See Hastie,2 F.3d at 1045-57.
34. Id at 1045 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DIcnoNARY 1200 (5th ed. 1979)) (citations

omitted).
35.

Id at 1045-46.
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constitute proceeds of the FirstBank stock.36 The Tenth Circuit
accordingly held that under Oklahoma law, the FDIC's security
interest in the dividends was "not perfected."3 "
B.

Debunking the "Passageof Title" Conception: A HistoryLesson

The passage of title analysis reflected in Hastie and other cases
is hopelessly inconsistent with the proper scope of the term
"proceeds." One can construct the proper scope of the term
"proceeds" by reviewing the actions of the U.C.C. drafters in
revising Article 9. On two occasions following the enactment of
Article 9, statutory amendments have reinforced the notion that
courts should not construe Section 9-306(1) in a formalistic fashion
that focuses upon location of title, but in a functional manner that
focuses upon whether some event has consumed the economic value
These two
or the productive capacity of the collateral.
amendments-the 1972 revision of Section 9-306(1) involving
casualty insurance payments 38 and the 1987 revision of Section 1201(37) 39 concerning the distinction between "true" and "security"
leases-reflect the emerging economic conception of the term
"proceeds."
1.

Insurance Payments as Proceeds

When a casualty destroys an item of property, casualty
insurance provides a monetary substitute to compensate the property
owner for the loss in value occasioned by the casualty. If X totals her
car and X's insurer pays her $15,000 for her loss, X is in a position
36. See id.
37. l at 1045. Technically, the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the FDIC's security
interest in the dividends was unperfected is incorrect. In fact, under the Tenth Circuit's
analysis, the FDIC had no continuing security interest in the dividends at all, by virtue of
Bankruptcy Code § 552(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). Under § 552(a), a prepetition
security interest in dividends would not attach to any dividends received by the debtor after
the petition date. See id. § 552(a). Thus, the FDIC would have no continuing security
interest in the postpetition dividends, unless the postpetition dividends were also proceeds of
other prepetition collateral. In that case, the FDIC would receive a continuing security
interest against the dividends by virtue of § 552(b). See supra note 32. Once the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the dividends were not proceeds of the FirstBank stock, the Tenth
Circuit should have held that the FDIC had no security interest, perfected or otherwise, in
the dividends under § 552(a).
38. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972) (current version at U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1990)).
39. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987) (current version at U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1990)).
HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 655 1994-1995
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similar to one that she would have occupied had she sold her car to Y
for $15,000 cash, in which case the $15,000 cash clearly would be
proceeds of the car under Section 9-306(1). 40 Prior to 1972,
however, Section 9-306(1) did not explicitly address the issue of
whether insurance moneys received upon the destruction of Article 9
collateral constituted proceeds of that collateral. 41 Section 9-306(l)'s
silence on this point generated a substantial number of lawsuits
involving competing claims to insurance moneys. Secured parties
with liens upon damaged collateral argued that insurance moneys
were a substitute for the damaged collateral, which had suffered a
disposition under Section 9-306(1). Debtors and bankruptcy trustees
sought to retain insurance moneys free of secured claims, arguing
that since no transfer of title to the collateral had taken place, the
insurance payments could not constitute proceeds.
Under the 1962 version of Section 9-306(1), the vast majority of
courts addressing this issue concluded that since damaged collateral
was not disposed of under Section 9-306(1), insurance moneys were
not proceeds of the damaged collateral.42 The decision of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in Universal C.I.T Credit Corp. v. Prudential
Investment Corp.43 is typical of these decisions. In March 1964,
Eugene Tourtellot granted Prudential a security interest in an
International tractor in which Mack Financial Corporation (Mack)
already claimed a first priority lien.' Tourtellot thereafter traded the
40. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1990).
41. The 1962 version of § 9-306(1) provided:
"Proceeds" includes whatever is received when collateral or proceeds is sold,
exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of. The term also includes the
account arising when the right to payment is earned under a contract right.
Money, checks and the like are "cash proceeds". All other proceeds are "noncash
proceeds".
U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1962) (current version at U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1990)).
42. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 696 E2d 213, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1982); In re
Whitacre, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1169, 1174-75 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1976); In re
Parks, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 334, 334-35 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1976); In re
Waltman, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 576, 579 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1975); In re Hix, 9
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 925, 927-28 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1969); In re Levine, 6 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 238, 241 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1969); White v. Household Fin. Corp.,
302 N.E.2d 828, 836 n.9 (Ill. Ct. App. 1973); Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d 94, 95-96 (Me.
1968); Third Nat'l Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 446 N.E.2d 380, 382 (Mass. 1983); In re
Boyd, 658 P.2d 470, 471-74 (Okla. 1983); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv.
Corp., 222 A.2d 571,574-75 (R.I. 1966).
43. 222 A.2d 571.
44. Id. at 572.
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International tractor toward the purchase of a new Diamond T tractor
from United Truck and Bus Service Company (United)4 5 United,
which had no knowledge of the outstanding security interests in the
International tractor, financed Tourtellot's purchase using a conditional
sales contract, which United later assigned to Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. (C1T).6 Tourtellot insured the Diamond T tractor pursuant to a
policy listing CiT as loss payee.47
Shortly thereafter, Tourtellot had an accident that destroyed the
Diamond T tractor.4s At this point, United learned that Mack
possessed a prior lien on the International tractor and that the Diamond
T trailer had been destroyed.49 At United's insistence, Tourtellot
assigned to United all of his interest in the proceeds of the insurance
contract, to the extent of $6,300.50 After Tourtellot's insurance carrier
paid $15,494.25 to CIT under its policy, CIT satisfied its claim and
deposited the remaining moneys into court, interpleading Prudential
and United. 5 In the ensuing action, Prudential claimed priority in52the
remaining insurance moneys as proceeds of the Diamond T tractor.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court established two grounds for
rejecting Prudential's argument. First, the court concluded that
"[i]nsurance moneys or proceeds flow from the insurance contract and
not from the property insured.' 5 3 The court stated:
While moneys paid by an insurance carrier to reimburse one for a
loss which is covered under the insurance contract are many times
referred to as insurance proceeds, they are not proceeds as that term is
defined in § 6A-9-306(l).
"Proceeds" by definition under the code arises from either a sale,
exchange, collection or other disposition of either the collateral or
proceeds. Insurance moneys or proceeds, however, arise and are paid
as the result of a contract. An insurance contract or policy, so called,
pertains to the persons to the contract and not to the item insured. It is

45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 572-73.
Id.

48.

Id. at 573.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id
lId
Id.
Id
Id. at 575.
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a personal contract which does not attach to or run with the property
insured.514
Instead of relying solely upon this contractual analysis, the court
found a second justification for its interpretation of the term
"proceeds" as used in Section 9-306(1). Adopting the passage of
title conception of proceeds, the court concluded that "the loss here
of the 1964 Diamond T was neither a sale, exchange, collection nor
such other disposition as to come within the meaning of this
section."'55
Decisions like Universal C.LT Credit Corp. reflected a triumph
of form over function in judicial interpretation of Section 9-306(1).
Following a casualty loss, the owner of a damaged item may possess
nominal title to that item.56 The casualty, however, has irretrievably
reduced the utility of that title by an amount equal to the total reduction
of the collateral's economic value. The insurance moneys collected
following a casualty are a direct substitute for that lost economic value.
If one attempted to hypothesize the ex ante bargain of the
reasonable debtor and secured party, one would expect them to
understand that insurance moneys would stand in the stead of damaged
collateral.5 Recognizing this, in 1972 the U.C.C. drafters revised
Section 9-306(1), overruling decisions like Universal C.I.T Credit

54. Id. at 574.
55. Id. at 575.
56. However, this is not necessarily the case. If the collateral was a total loss, the
insurer might require assignment of title to the collateral in exchange for payment of the
claim, or the insurer may become subrogated to the insured's title to the collateral either by
the express terms of the policy or under equitable principles. See ROBERT E. KEErON &
ALANI. WIDIss, INSURANCE LAW § 3.10(a)(1), at 219-20 (practitioner's ed. 1988).
57. 2 QUINN, supra note 14, 1 9-306[A][11], at 9-309 ("Any sane lender wants the
collateral insured, and he wants it for a very obvious reason. He is relying on that collateral,
and, if it goes up in smoke, he wants to see the insurance money standing in its place. It's as
simple as that...."). The Bankruptcy Code's provisions regarding adequate protection and
relief from the automatic stay contain further support for this proposition. A bankrupt
debtor may not retain and use collateral over the objection of the secured party unless the
debtor can provide the secured party with adequate protection of its interest in the collateral.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361(l)-(3), 362(d)(1), 363(e) (1988). Because failure to insure the
collateral would pose a substantial threat to the secured party's interest in case of a casualty,
the debtor must at a minimum insure the collateral in order to provide the secured party with
adequate protection. See DAvID G. EPsTEIN ET AL, BANKRUPTCY § 3-27(b), at 143 (1993).
As a normative matter, the Bankruptcy Code's adequate protection provisions capture the
expected ex ante bargain of the reasonable debtor and secured party that insurance proceeds
would stand in the stead of the collateral following a casualty.
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Corp. and expressly codifying this expected ex ante bargain.58 The
revision added a sentence to Section 9-306(1), making clear that
"[i]nsurance payable by reason of loss or damage to the collateral is
proceeds" of the collateral.5 9 The 1972 amendment thus reflects the
origin of an economic, value-based conception of proceeds that
depends upon whether an asset constitutes a return for some event that
extracted economic value from the collateral. 6°
2.

Lease Payments as Proceeds

There are several ways in which one can use an item of
collateral in operating a business. For example, one can use a
machine by selling it to a third party for cash and using that cash to
fund operations. In that case, the cash clearly would constitute
proceeds of the machine under Section 9-306(1).61 Alternatively,
one could use a machine by leasing it to third parties for their use.
One might also characterize the leasing of collateral as a disposition,
such that any rents paid by the lessee would constitute proceeds of
the collateral. 62 The lessor grants the lessee exclusive use of the

58. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1990).
59.
l The drafters noted that this sentence was "intended to overrule various cases
to the effect that proceeds of insurance on collateral are not proceeds of the collateral."
PERMANENT EDrroniAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT,

Section 9-306 Reasons for Change 97-98 (1971) [hereinafter Reasons for Change].
60. At least one court interpreting the 1962 version of § 9-306(2) concluded that the
1972 revision merely expressed what was implicit in the language of the 1962 version:
As the reporter's commentary to this amendment indicates, the "new ... sentence
...is intended to overrule various cases to the effect that proceeds of insurance on
collateral are not proceeds of the collateral." Although this amendment has not
yet been adopted in New York, it is a persuasive indication of the effect which
§ 9-306 was originally intended to have.... mhe fact that the state legislature
had not yet enacted this amendment does not preclude a federal court from
rendering a decision which is consistent with the original intention underlying
§ 9-306.
PPG Indus. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Reasons for
Change, supranote 59, at 97-98) (first two omissions in original).
61. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1990).
62. This characterization finds both support and criticism in § 9-504(1), which
permits a secured party to "sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of' collateral after default. IK.
§ 9-504(1). On the one hand, one can argue that § 9-504(1) subsumes the terms "sell" and
"lease" within the concept of disposition by using the word "otherwise," so that leasing
property constitutes a disposition under § 9-306(1). On the other hand, one can argue that
the presence of the term 'lease" in § 9-504(1) demonstrates that the drafters omitted it
intentionally in § 9-306(1). The court in In re Cleary Brothers Construction Co., 9 B.R. 40
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leased property for a term, during which the lessor contractually
agrees not to disturb the lessee's possession and use. Such a transfer
of rights respecting property fits squarely within a meaningful
conception of the term "disposition. 63
Most courts analyzing lease transactions under Section 9-306(1),
however, have adopted a "permanent passage of title" analysis to
conclude that rent payments are not proceeds of the leased collateral. 64
The seminal case addressing this issue is In re Cleary Brothers
Construction Co.65 In this case, Cleary Brothers owned a crane in
which it had granted a security interest to General Electric Credit Corp.
(GECC).6 6 After filing for bankruptcy protection, Cleary Brothers
leased the crane, without the permission or knowledge of GECC, to a
third party for ten days at an agreed rent of $10,668.67 Upon learning
of the lease, GECC argued to the bankruptcy court that the $10,668
constituted proceeds of the crane that Cleary Brothers had to apply to
satisfy GECC's claim.68 The bankruptcy court disagreed, holding that
"the term 'proceeds' does not include rents" paid for the use of the
crane, since "[t]he words 'otherwise disposed of' related to a
permanent or final conversion, not to a temporary use., 69 The
bankruptcy court accordingly held that GECC had no lien on the
$10,668 of rent paid to Cleary Brothers. 70 According to the
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980), seems to have embraced this latter argument. See infra notes 65-73
and accompanying text.
Taken in isolation, neither of these statutory arguments is compelling. As discussed in
the following text, § 9-306(1) should be interpreted in the context of the U.C.C.'s evolving
sensitivity to economic substance over legal form, as demonstrated in the 1972 amendment
to § 9-306(1) and the 1987 amendment to § 1-201(37). See infra notes 74-81 and
accompanying text; see also U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-306(1) (1990). Under this approach,
the leasing of property would constitute a disposition within the meaning of § 9-306(1).
63. Cf. Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1978)
("Mhough 'other disposition' cannot technically be characterized as a sale or exchange, at
the minimum it must meet the threshold test of these two transactions by effecting a transfer
of property.").
64. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
65. 9 B.R. 40.
66. Id. at40.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 41.
69. Id.; see also Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Gaucher, 386 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1979) (finding that "other disposition" as used in U.C.C. § 9-306(1) implies a
"permanent transfer of possession"). The court in ClearyBrotherswas interpreting the 1962
version of § 9-306(1), which read slightly differently in pertinent part from the 1972 version.
See supranote 41.
70. ClearyBros., 9 B.R. at 41.
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bankruptcy court, if GECC wanted a lien upon rents, it should have
taken an assignment of any leases of the crane:
Had the [drafters of the U.C.C.] intended to extend the lenders lien to
include rent from the temporary use of collateral which has been given
as security, they would have included the term "leased."
This failure to do so could not have been inadvertent. The way to
create a security interest in rent under the U.C.C. is to assign the lease
or to give a security interest in the lease. The rent would then be the
proceeds of the collateral... 71
Many subsequent judicial decisions revisiting this issue have agreed
with Cleary Brothers without engaging in substantial analysis.72
71. IMl By suggesting that GECC should have taken an assignment of the lease, the
Cleary Brothers court merely begged the real question. If GECC had taken a direct
assignment of the lease, GECC would have acquired without question a security interest in
the rent due under that lease. That statement says nothing about whether or not the lease
was not already GECC's collateral, as proceeds of the crane.
As discussed in the text, Cleary Brothers' rights as embodied in the lease of the crane
(including the right to collect rents) are without question proceeds of the crane under § 9306(1). See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1990). The U.C.C. acknowledges this point in § 9-308(b),
which establishes the rule governing the priority disputes between an inventory lender and a
purchaser of chattel paper, which can include a lease of goods under § 9-105(1)(b). See id.
§ 9-308(b) (providing that the purchaser of chattel paper for value in the ordinary course of
business takes priority over an inventory lender claiming security interest in chattel paper
"merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest"). For an inventory lender to
have a security interest in the lease of an item of inventory collateral "merely as proceeds" of
that inventory, the lease of that item must constitute a disposition under § 9-306(1);
otherwise, the inventory lender would have no basis for claiming any security interest in the
chattel paper. See id. § 9-306(1).
As a result, the $10,668 paid by Cleary Brothers' lessee on account of its contractual
obligation was proceeds of the lease, which in turn was proceeds of the crane, squarely
within § 9-306(1). GECC did not need to take an assignment of the lease in order to obtain
a security interest in the rents; § 9-306(1) duplicates the expected ex ante bargain of the
parties by automatically granting GECC a security interest in the lease. See id.
It is true that a prudent secured party in GECC's position should take a separate
assignment of leases and should take possession of any lease entered into by the debtor.
This would protect the secured party against the risk that the debtor might sell the lease to a
subsequent purchaser for value, who would take priority as to the lease under § 9-308. See
i. § 9-308. Thus, a prudent secured creditor must take these extra steps to obtain protection
against third parties dealing subsequently with the debtor. However, these additional steps
are unnecessary against the debtor and the bankruptcy trustee. Section 9-306's proceeds
coverage alone suffices to protect the secured party against the debtor and lien creditors. Cf
11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988) (providing that a bankruptcy trustee assumes the status of lien
creditor against property of bankruptcy estate).
72. E.g., In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, 133 B.R. 850, 856 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1991); In re Keneco Fin. Group, 131 B.R. 90, 94 (Bankr N.D. Ml. 1991); In re Investment
Hotel Properties, 109 B.R. 990, 995-96 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re A.E.I. Corp., 11 B.R.
97, 100-02 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). But see In re Southern Equip. Sales Co., 24 B.R. 788,
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Cleary Brothers' formalistic definition of the words "other
disposition" is hopelessly inconsistent with the economic realities of
property leasing. Debtor-owners of encumbered property can dispose
of that property's economic value in several ways. They may dispose
of the property's entire economic value at once in an outright sale.
Alternatively, they may dispose of the property's economic value in a
piecemeal fashion, by contracting away the collateral for temporary
use over its useful life. For example, suppose Secured Party holds a
security interest in Debtor's new truck. Unbeknownst to Secured
Party, Debtor leases the truck to Lessee for $300 per month, the same
amount that Debtor must pay Secured Party under its security
agreement. After three months of nonpayment by Debtor, Secured
Party attempts to repossess the truck and discovers that Debtor has
leased it to Lessee. By the time Secured Party repossesses the truck
from Lessee, the truck has generated three months of use by Lessee
and three contractual payments from Lessee to Debtor. The three
months of use have consumed a portion of the truck's economic value,
just as certainly as if Debtor had sold outright title to collateral worth
an equivalent amount. The $900 of lease payments simply reflects the
exchange value that Debtor received for that portion of the truck's
economic value.
Once one recognizes that leasing property consumes its economic
value and productive capacity, Cleary Brothers' conclusion that
Section 9-306(1) requires "a permanent or final conversion, not a
temporary use ' 7 3 becomes entirely unpersuasive. Such a permanent
passage of title conception is flatly inconsistent with the rationale
behind the 1972 revision to Section 9-306(1), which rejected the
passage of title analysis manifested in early casualty insurance cases. 74
Further, the permanent passage of title concept was plainly contrary to
Article 9's general philosophy that the location of title to collateral is

794 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (characterizing sums paid upon leases of inventory collateral as
proceeds received upon disposition of such collateral).
73. ClearyBros., 9 B.R. at 41; see also In re S & J Holding Corp., 42 B.R. 249, 250
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (finding that cash generated through collateral "not received from
the sale of collateral, but rather, through the use of it ... does not make it 'proceeds"');
Mechanics Nat'l Bank, 386 N.E.2d at 1055 (finding that "other disposition" as used in
U.C.C. § 9-306(1) implies a'permanent transfer of possession").
74. See supra part II.B.1.
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less significant in determining rights than the economic substance of
the transaction.75
Finally, the drafters dispelled any continuing doubt about the
illegitimacy of the permanent passage of title concept in 1987 when
they revised Section 1-201(37) and its definition of the term "security
interest." Section 1-201(37) provides courts with guidance in
classifying personal property leases as either true leases, which are
outside the scope of Article 9's coverage, or disguised secured sales,
subject to the provisions of Article 976 Prior to 1987, Section 1201(37)' 7 provided little concrete guidance to courts and generated a
morass of conflicting decisions. In1987, the drafters responded with a
more detailed definition 78 that emphasizes the economic substance of
the leasing transaction:
Whether a transaction creates a lease or security interest is
determined by the facts of each case; however, a transaction creates a
security interest if the consideration the lessee is to pay the lessor for
the right to possession and use of the goods is an obligation for the
term of the lease not subject to termination by the lessee, and
(a) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the
remaining economic life of the goods,
(b) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining
economic life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the
goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining
economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or
nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease
agreement, or
(d) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for
no additional consideration or nominal 79
additional consideration
upon compliance with the lease agreement.

At first glance, this provision seems to have nothing to do with Section
9-306(1) and the scope of the term "proceeds." The amendment,
75.

See U.C.C. § 9-202 cmt. (1990) ("The rights and duties of the parties to a

security transaction and of third parties are stated in this Article without reference to the
location of 'title' to the collateral.").
76. See id.§ 1-201(37) cmt. 37 ("The focus of the changes [to the definition of
security interest] was to draw a sharper line between leases and security interests disguised

as leases to create greater certainty in commercial transactions.").
77.
78.
79.

See id § 1-201(37) (1972) (current version at U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1990)).
Id § 1-201(37) cmt. 37 (1990).
Id § 1-201(37).
HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 663 1994-1995

664

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

however, holds the key to the proper scope of the term "proceeds," for
it further demonstrates the drafters' emerging focus upon economic
reality as a determinant of the rights of parties to secured transactions
rather than legal form.80 As discussed above, when an owner leases
property, this transfers a portion of the property's economic value and
productive capacity to the lessee. If a lease transaction effectively
transfers the entire economic value of the property to the lessee, then
Section 1-201(37) treats the transaction as a sale rather than a lease.
As a result, the lessor must comply with Article 9's filing requirements
in order to protect its interest in the leased property against third
parties.
Section 1-201(37) explicitly recognizes that the leasing
transaction involves a transfer of economic value. Section 1-201(37)
thus effectively requires courts to characterize a lease as a disposition
under Section 9-306(1), as a simple example demonstrates. Assume
Secured Party sells two new cars to Debtor. Secured Party retains a
purchase money security interest in the cars, but does not take an
assignment of leases. Each new car is worth $10,000 and has an
expected value of $2,000 after 36 months of use. Debtor then leases
the first car to Lessee #1 for $320 per month for 36 months, with no
option to purchase, and the second car to Lessee #2 for $320 per
month for 36 months with an option to purchase the car for $250 at the
end of the lease term. Under Section 1-201(37), Lease #1 is a true
lease, since it affords the lessee no ability to capture the car's expected
remaining economic value at the end of the lease term. Section 1201(37) treats Lease #2, however, as a secured transaction, since
Lessee #2 can acquire the car's remaining economic value for a
nominal consideration upon compliance with the lease.81
In each case, Debtor disposes of its right to use the cars for a
three-year period, during which one expects the respective lessees to
consume $8,000 of each car's economic value. Under the Cleary
Brothers permanent passage of title analysis, Secured Party would
have no security interest in the $320 per month Debtor receives under
Lease #1 because that is a true lease and Secured Party took no
80. The drafters advised that this definition was intended to "focus on economics."
d. § 1-201(37) cmt. 37.
81. See id. § 1-201(37)(d). Since it is reasonably certain that Lessee #2 will capture
the full economic value of the collateral, § 1-201(37) treats Lease #2 as a sale ab initio. See
supranotes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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assignment of Lease #1. But since Lease #2 is a secured transaction,
Lease #2 is treated as a sale. Since the word "sale" clearly appears in
Section 9-306(1), the plain meaning of that Section would require the
conclusion that each $320 payment that Debtor receives from Lessee
#2 is proceeds of the collateral.
If Cleary Brotherswas correct, then Secured Party would have a
lien upon the $320 per month paid by Lessee #2, but not upon the
$320 per month paid by Lessee #1. Such a result is absurd, since both
leases have exactly the same effect upon Secured Party's collateral.
During their respective terms, each lease takes a portion of the
economic value of the property and transfers that value to the lessee.
The lease payments represent compensation received by Debtor upon
the exhaustion of that economic value. As between Debtor and
Secured Party, the characterization of each lease as a "true lease" or
"disguised sale" does not change the substance of the lessee's
payments. Those payments fit within the scope of the term "proceeds"
just as certainly as if outright title to collateral worth that amount had
passed to the respective lessees.
To correctly classify lease payments as proceeds, therefore, one
must appreciate that treating lease payments as proceeds in fact
captures the ex ante bargain of the reasonable debtor and secured party.
When the debtor "consumes" the economic value of collateral by
permanent transfer of full title to a third party for cash, Sections 9203(3)82 and 9-30683 provide the secured party with a continuing lien
upon that cash. These sections reflect the U.C.C.'s assumption that the
reasonable debtor and secured party, bargaining ex ante, would
understand that the secured party should retain an interest in that
cash.84 As demonstrated above, piecemeal consumption of the
collateral by third parties has precisely the same effect on the secured
82. See U.C.C. § 9-203(3) (1990) ("Unless otherwise agreed a security agreement
gives the secured party the rights to proceeds provided by Section 9-306.").
83. See id.
§ 9-306.
84. Professor Hawkland has suggested that § 9-203(3)
automatically gives the parties a right to collateral (proceeds) that is usually
bargained for even in those cases in which the parties have forgotten to implement
their bargain by appropriate language in the security agreement. In the unusual

case in which the parties do not want proceeds included as part of the collateral,
they have the option of excluding it .... Efficiency is promoted ... because the

parties must act affirmatively only in unusual cases ....
Hawkland, supra note 4, at 16.
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party's collateral as an outright sale. Thus, one would expect the
reasonable debtor and secured party to treat these situations in similar
fashion, with the secured party obtaining an interest in the lease
payments by virtue of Section 9-306's proceeds coverage."5
Following the 1987 amendment to Section 1-201(37), the
U.C.C.'s primary interpretive body explicitly tied together Sections 1201(37) and 9-306(1) in a fashion that clearly rejects the passage of
title conception of proceeds in favor of an economic, value-based
conception of that term. In 1992, the Permanent Editorial Board of the
U.C.C. rejected the Cleary Brothers case and its progeny in PEB
CommentaryNumber 9, stating that
[w]here a debtor has granted to a secured party a security interest in
goods that the debtor later leases as lessor, the lease rentals would
constitute proceeds of the secured party's collateral for the reason that
the debtor's conveyance of a leasehold interest in the goods constitutes
a disposition of the goods for purposes of § 9-306(1).86
Together with the 1987 amendment, PEB Commentary Number 9
provides additional support for a broad, value-based conception of
the term "proceeds," one that focuses on the presence of an event
that exhausts the collateral's economic value or productive capacity
of the bargained-for collateral.

85. Again, one can find additional support for this normative proposition in the
Bankruptcy Code. First, under § 363(e), a bankruptcy court must prohibit a debtor from the
use, sale, or lease of collateral over the secured party's objection unless the debtor can
provide adequate protection of the secured party's interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988).
To the extent that the debtor's lease of the collateral threatens the value of the collateral,
§ 363(e) requires the debtor to provide the secured party with protection against this threat
in the form of cash payments, a replacement lien, or otherwise. See id. § 361(1)-(3);
EP TEIN Er AL., supra note 57, § 10-5, at 739. Second, under § 552(b), the secured party's
interest in prepetition collateral generally extends to rents, profits and products of that
collateral even though the debtor may generate those rents, profits, and products
postpetition. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 214, 108 Stat.
4106, 4126 (1994) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)); infra notes 218-219 and
accompanying text. Section 552(b) thus prevents the debtor from exhausting the value or
productive capacity of the collateral to the detriment of the secured party's interest.
Together, §§ 363(e) and 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code capture the expected ex ante
bargain of the reasonable debtor and secured party that if the debtor leases the collateral, the
lease payments would also stand as security for the debt.
86. PEB CoMM NARY ON THE UNiFoRM CoMMERcIAL CODE, CoMMENTARY No. 9
(1992) [hereinafter PEB COMMENTARY No. 9].
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C. Recognizing andApplying the Emerging True Scope of the Term
"Proceeds"
A proper understanding of the 1972 and 1987 amendments
discussed above87 is critical to the correct interpretation of Section 9-

306(1)'s definition of the term "proceeds." These amendments
rearticulated and reinforced the U.C.C. drafters' original intention
that Article 9 should "make distinctions, where distinctions are
necessary, along functional rather than formal lines. 88 Both
individually and collectively, the 1972 and 1987 amendments reflect
the concern of their respective drafters that as a matter of sound
commercial policy, results should be informed by the economic
substance of a transaction rather than its form.
From these amendments and their emphasis upon economic
substance, one can easily extrapolate the proper scope of the term
"proceeds" under Section 9-306. Whether the debtor retains title to
the collateral is irrelevant; in an economic sense, the term "proceeds"
properly includes whatever assets the debtor receives by virtue of an
event that exhausts or consumes some or all of the collateral's
economic value or productive capacity. Once courts appreciate the
emphasis upon economic substance manifested so overtly in these
amendments, courts cannot simply dismiss this underlying policy in
favor of a formalistic passage of title analysis. The U.C.C.'s rules of
construction expressly reject such formalistic interpretation, mandating
instead a functional construction whereby U.C.C. provisions "shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
89
policies."
Nevertheless, many courts refuse to acknowledge the emerging
true scope of the term "proceeds" and continue to treat passage of title
as the key to classification under Section 9-306(1).' One solution, of
87. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81.
88. U.C.C.§ 9-101 cmt. (1990).
89. Id. § 1-102(1) (emphasis added). Comment 1 to § 1-102 provides further
emphasis:
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes
and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose
and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and
the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the
case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.
Id.§ 1-102 cmt. 1.
90. See suprapart l.A-B.
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course, is to revise Article 9 to reverse these decisions and explicitly
reject the passage of title concept as a legitimate basis for classifying
assets as proceeds of collateral. 91 The current Article 9 revision
process should accomplish this solution eventually. In the meantime,
however, cases continue to arise, such as those involving the proper
characterization of stock dividends92 and tort claims9 3 under Section 9306. In deciding these cases, courts can and should read Section 9306(1) broadly enough to give effect to the proper scope of the term
"proceeds."
1.

Stock Dividends as Proceeds: Rejecting the Tenth Circuit's
Hastie Analysis

As discussed previously,9 4 the Tenth Circuit concluded in
Hastie that cash dividends did not constitute proceeds of stock
within the meaning of Section 9-306(1). 9' This conclusion cannot be
squared with the emerging economic scope of the term "proceeds,"
for cash dividends clearly reflect a return upon the productive
capacity of stock.
a.

The Case of the Liquidating Dividend

One can more easily understand the error in the Tenth Circuit's
analysis in Hastie by considering how that court apparently would
have interpreted Section 9-306(1) to classify a liquidating dividend.
Suppose Debtor owns 248 shares of stock in ABC Company (ABC)
and has granted Secured Party a security interest in those shares.
The shareholders of ABC subsequently elect to dissolve the
corporation, and upon that dissolution ABC pays to its shareholders
a liquidating dividend of five dollars per share.
Such a liquidating dividend fits squarely within the scope of the
term "proceeds," even if one adheres nominally to the passage of title
conception. If each shareholder turns over possession of its share
certificates in exchange for the dividend, the transaction would qualify
as an exchange under Section 9-306(1).96 If each shareholder instead
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See infra part IV.
See infra part II.C.1.
See infra part ll.C.2.
See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
In re Hastie, 2 E3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1993).
See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1990).

HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 668 1994-1995

1995]

U.C.C. SECTION 9-306

669

retained possession of its share certificates, the liquidating dividend
still constitutes proceeds of the stock, as the liquidating dividend is the
functional equivalent of a casualty that totally destroys the stock. After
payment of the dividend, the remaining certificates are mere paper
with no economic value since the underlying firm value was "disposed
of" through a casualty-the dissolution and subsequent liquidation of
the company. Therefore, as the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Texas concluded in Aycock v. Texas Commerce
Bank; NA., 97 and as the Tenth Circuit hinted in Hastie,9 8 a liquidating
dividend falls squarely within the scope of the term "proceeds" in
Section 9-306(1). 99
b.

Ordinary Cash Dividends

Must the foregoing analysis change if ABC declares and pays a
cash dividend in the ordinary course of business operations?
According to the Tenth Circuit in Hastie, the answer is "yes" because
that dividend payment would not constitute a disposition of Secured
Party's collateral.' ° As the Tenth Circuit reasoned:
The receipt of cash dividends by a registered owner of certificated
securities bears no resemblance to the events specified in the definition
of proceeds or to an act of disposition generally. Common stock
represents an ownership interest in the issuing corporation. Under
Oklahoma law, a cash dividend is a distribution of the issuing
corporation's capital surplus or retained earnings. Thus, although the
cash dividend distributes assets of the corporation, it does not alter the
ownership interest represented by the stock. The cash dividend,
therefore, is not a disposition of the stock. Normally, stock is not
disposed of, sold, or exchanged in any way unless a change in the
ownership interest in the issuing corporation is thereby effected. 0°'
97. 127 B.R. 17 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991).
98. 2 F.3d 1042. The Tenth Circuit did not expressly decide whether a liquidating
dividend constituted proceeds of stock because that issue was "not presented." Id at 1046.
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit cited Aycock, which treated liquidating dividends as
proceeds of stock, id (citing Aycock, 127 B.R. at 18-19), and the Hastie court further noted
that in dissolution situations, "an exchange of stock is frequently required." l Since the
Tenth Circuit made this comment in an attempt to distinguish ordinary dividends from
liquidating dividends, it seems fair to suggest that had the Tenth Circuit faced the question
directly, it would have held that liquidating dividends constitute proceeds of stock.
99. Id; Aycock, 127 B.R. at 18-19.
100. Hastie,2 F.3d at 1045.
101. Id at 1045-46 (citations omitted).
HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 669 1994-1995

670

TULANE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 69

Boiled down to its essence, the Tenth Circuit's rationale is that since
the FDIC still owns the stock, the cash dividends cannot be proceeds
of the stock. 102
Since the Tenth Circuit relies entirely upon the passage of title
conception rejected in the 1972 and 1987 amendments, however, its
rationale lacks persuasive force. Likewise, the court's interpretation of
Section 9-306(1) is further weakened by the court's attempt to contrast
ordinary and liquidating dividends:
We need not decide if a different rule would be appropriate for a
liquidating dividend as the issue is not presented. We note only that in
such situations an exchange of stock is frequently required. Nor do we
view ordinary cash dividends as something akin to a "recovery" for
damage to the underlying stock. The impact of cash dividends on the
value of common stock and on the equity of the stockholder therein is a
factual matter of the kind and complexity outside the scope of this
litigation. We are aware that under certain conditions so-called
"ordinary cash dividends" under Oklahoma law might be paid out to a
102. Id The Tenth Circuit also claimed to find additional support for its
interpretation of proceeds in U.C.C. § 8-321(3). Id. at 1046-47. Section 8-321(3) provides:
A security interest in a security is subject to the provisions of Article 9, but:
(a) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(b) no written security agreement signed by the debtor is necessary to
make the security interest enforceable .... The secured party has the rights
and duties provided under Section 9-207, to the extent they are
applicable....

U.C.C. § 8-321(3) (1990). Comment 3 to § 8-321 further states that "in the absence of
agreement to the contrary, the secured party ... would have the duty to remit dividends he
received to the debtor or to apply them in reduction of the obligation under Section 9207(2)(c)." Id § 8-321 cmt. 3. From these sections, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that
it would be inconsistent with U.C.C. § 8-321 and U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(c) to treat
cash dividends as proceeds of common stock.. . . It would be inconsistent to treat
cash dividends as proceeds of the stock in which the security interest in the stock
continued, and yet at the same time classify the cash dividends as increase and
profits, and require that they be remitted to the debtor or applied to the secured
obligation.
Hastie, 2 E3d at 1046-47 (citations omitted).
This argument makes no sense. It is perfectly consistent to treat the FirstBank
dividends as proceeds of the FirstBank stock and at the same time compel the FDIC to either
remit the dividend to the debtor or to apply it against the debt. Secured parties cannot
simply keep proceeds of collateral free and clear of the debtor's interest; the proceeds are
only security for a debt. After default, Article 9 should require the secured party to either
apply those moneys to the debt or remit them to the debtor, and this requirement should
continue until the secured party forecloses the debtor's interest in the collateral. Thus, the
fact that § 9-207(2) requires the secured party to account for any dividends has no relation to
whether the dividends are proceeds of the stock.
HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 670 1994-1995

1995]

U.C.C. SECTION 9-306

671

point at or near the point of insolvency for the issuing corporation. We
take some, albeit small, comfort in the fact that this is not the ordinary
situation.103
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, under Oklahoma corporation law, Hastie's shares represented
10 4
his proportionate residual claim against the net assets of FirstBank.
If under Oklahoma law Hastie's share certificates entitled him to a
residual claim against FirstBank's net assets, simple math
demonstrates that the payment of a cash dividend has the effect of
reducing Hastie's residual claim.05 Thus, despite the contrary
103. Hastie, 2 F3d at 1046 (citations omitted).
104. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1035 (West 1986).

105. Assume that during the pendency of Hastie's bankruptcy, FirstBank declared and
paid dividends totaling $80 million. Following those dividends, FirstBank would retain $80
million fewer in assets against which Hastie possesses a residual claim. By declaring and
paying these dividends, FirstBank thus disposes of $80 million of its firm value--value that
is embodied in the share certificates that Hastie assigned to the FDIC as collateral.
It is true, of course, that no shareholder can take unilateral action to compel FirstBank
to distribute his or her share of the residual value of FirstBank's assets. If a shareholder
wishes to extract the value from his or her shares prior to FirstBank's dissolution, the
shareholder's only option would be to sell his or her shares in a market transaction. As
such, one might argue that the value of stock is not damaged by declaration and payment of
a dividend unless one can demonstrate a resulting reduction in the share price. The debtor
in Hastie made this very argument to support his claim that the dividends were not
"proceeds" of the FirstBank stock:
[Playment of dividends by a solvent corporation is a distribution of profit which
does not affect the underlying equity of the corporation. Stock prices do not rise
and fall on a dollar for dollar basis with the payment of dividends. In fact, it is
Debtor's belief that a history of dividend payments may increase the value of
stock while the failure to pay a dividend in a given year could decrease the value
of stock.
Brief of Appellee at 9, In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-6034).
This argument, however, confuses a company's dividend policy and its effect on share
price with the effect of any specific dividend upon the firm value as reflected on its balance
sheet. Finance theorists generally accept as correct the thesis of Modigliani and Miller that a
company's dividend policy, or a change in that dividend policy, does not affect the value of
the company's shares. See RICHARD A. BREAEY & ST'wART C. MYERs, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FNANCE 376-80 (4th ed. 1991). Assuming the existence of perfectly efficient
capital markets, a change in FirstBank's dividend policy should have no impact upon the
share price of FirstBank stock because the stock price reflects the investors' interpretation of
all available information, and not simply the investors' acceptance of management's hopes
or fears about future earnings as reflected in the declared dividend. l at 383.
Once this is understood, it becomes apparent that the argument of the debtor in Hastie
is incorrect. Efficient market theory suggests that an ordinary cash dividend would not
cause a decrease in the price of the company's shares. Instead, one would expect the market
to take into account the expectation of future dividends by the company and to make any
corresponding adjustment in the price of the company's shares before the company actually
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assertion of the Tenth Circuit in Hastie, the dividends in some sense
1°
are akin to a "'recovery' for damage to the underlying collateral"
and should be treated as proceeds of the stock under Section 9306(1).
More significantly, when one acquires stock, one really acquires
the right to the future productive capacity of those shares. This future
productive capacity includes both share appreciation (increases in the
firm's share price over time) and dividends (periodic distributions of
finm value). If the proper scope of Section 9-306(1) is to protect a
secured party against exhaustion of the collateral's productive capacity,
declaration and payment of a cash dividend constitutes an event that
falls within the proper conception of the term "proceeds" under
Section 9-306(1).1° 7 The fact that the debtor still retains title to the
stock and the right to future dividends does not change economic
reality. The dividend is proceeds of the stock within the proper scope
of Section 9-306(1).
2.

Tort Settlements as Proceeds

Just as a secured party might claim a lien upon casualty
insurance payments received on account of damaged collateral, a
secured party might claim a lien upon its debtor's legal claim against
a tortfeasor who damaged the collateral. The tort claim and casualty
insurance moneys are conceptually similar, as each arise on account
of an event that damages the collateral's economic value. Given this
conceptual similarity, one might characterize the tort claim as
proceeds of the collateral by characterizing the tort as a disposition
of the collateral under Section 9-306(1). Early commentators,
however, questioned whether the language of Section 9-306(1)
declares and pays any particular dividend. Accordingly, the fact that the company's share
price remains the same immediately following a dividend is irrelevant. Once it is declared

and paid, the dividend is a disposition within the meaning of § 9-306(1), even though an
efficient market will already have taken that dividend into account in setting the company's
share price.
106. Hastie, 2 F3d at 1046; see also McGonigle v. Combs, 968 E2d 810, 828 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("If the purpose of [§ 9-306] is to be served, ... the security-holder must be
protected against diminutions in the value of the security that arise not only from sale, but
also from other events or transactions that damage the security."), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct.
399 (1992).
107. See PEB REPoR, supra note 15, at 111 (stating that a dividend is "so necessarily
and obviously associated with an interest in [the stock] that a security agreement and
financing statement ought not to be required to mention [it] explicitly').
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included tort settlements,' 08 and several courts subsequently used the
passage of title concept to exclude tort settlements from the scope of
proceeds under Section 9-306(1). 10'
The New York decision of Bank of New York v. Margiotta"0 is
typical of these cases. Simone and Linda Catalino owned a 1973
automobile subject to a security interest in favor of Bank of New
York."' The automobile was destroyed in an accident while being
driven by Charles Margiotta.1 2 Following this accident and a default
by the Catalinos, the Bank of New York obtained a judgment against
the Catalinos, which was returned unsatisfied.1 3 At that point, the
Bank of New York attempted to sue Margiotta for negligence, arguing
that the Catalinos' negligence14 claim against Margiotta was identifiable
proceeds of the automobile.'
The district court granted Margiotta's motion for summary
judgment, refusing to construe Section 9-306(1) so broadly as to make
the accident a disposition:
While a security interest continues in any identifiable proceeds of
the collateral covered by the security agreement and a third party may
be liable in conversion for paying those proceeds without satisfying the
secured party's interest, it is unclear whether identifiable proceeds may
be stretched to include a cause of action. This Court sees no
justification in so extending the statute." 5
The result in Margiottais technically correct. Section 9-104(k)
clearly states that Article 9 does not apply "to a transfer in whole or
108. E.g., Henry J. Boroff, Insurance Proceeds Under Section 9-306: Before and

After, 79 CoM. L.J. 442, 443-45 (1974); Hawkland, supra note 4, at 12-13. Although
Professor Hawkland suggested that any distinction between tort settlements and insurance
moneys was "hard to justify philosophically," he concluded that tort settlements
"presumably" would not constitute proceeds following the 1972 amendment to § 9-306(1).
Id
109. In re Boyd, 658 P.2d 470, 471-74 (Okla. 1983); Hoffman v. Snack, 2 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 862, 863 (Pa. Comm. Pleas 1964); see also New England Mortgage
Servs. Co. v. Petit, 590 A.2d 1054, 1055-56 (Me. 1991) (Maine statute extended a judgment
creditor's lien to proceeds of the debtor's property to the same extent that a secured party
would have interest in proceeds under § 9-306; court held that a judgment creditor could not
assert a lien upon any proceeds to be derived from the debtor's pending malpractice claim,
because Article 9 excludes tort claims from its scope).
110. 416 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
111. Id, at494.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at494.
115. Id at 495 (citations omitted).
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'
in part of any claim arising out of tort."116
Thus, the Bank of New
York should have lost the case since the Catalinos' right to sue could
not be the subject of a valid security interest." 7 The Margiotta
court's reasoning, however, is flawed. Section 9-104(k) has nothing
to do with whether the tort claim constitutes proceeds of the
automobile; that is determined solely by Section 9-306(1). Section
9-104(k) merely preempts the result otherwise dictated by Section 9306, so that an Article 9 security interest does not arise against the
tort claim, even if that tort claim would constitute proceeds of the
automobile under Section 9-306.
A tort claim for negligent damage to collateral arises on account
of an event that damaged the collateral's economic value. As a result,
a tort claim falls squarely within the proper scope of the term
"proceeds" despite Section 9-104(k). As a few courts have correctly
reasoned, further amendment to Section 9-306(1) is unnecessary to
treat tort settlements as proceeds of collateral." 8 The decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in McGonigle v.
Combs 9 demonstrates an appropriate recognition of the emerging,
economic conception of the term "proceeds." Brownell and Leslie
Combs were equal co-owners of Spendthrift Farms, Inc. (Spendthrift),
one of the world's largest horse breeding operations. 20 In 1983, the
Combs sold $35 million worth of stock in Spendthrift to thirty-four
investors in a private placement.12' Spendthrift followed this private
placement with a public offering of shares.122 In 1985, after a
precipitous fall in the price of Spendthrift shares, private investors
filed an action against the Combs for alleged violations of federal
securities laws."z

116. U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1990).
117. This result likely will change when the revision to Article 9 is complete. The
Article 9 Study Committee has recommended that Article 9 be revised "to include security
interests in claims (other than claims for personal injury) arising out of tort, to the extent that
such claims are assignable under applicable non-UCC law." PEB REPORT, supranote 15, at
58.'
118. E.g., McGonigle v. Combs, 968 E2d 810, 828 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed,
113 S. Ct. 399 (1992); In re Falkenberg, 136 B.R. 481,484-86 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); In
re Stone, 52 B.R. 305, 307-08 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
119. 968 F.2d 810.
120. Id. at 814.
121. Id,
122. Id,
123. Id. at 815.
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One of the plaintiffs, Casares, had borrowed $750,000 from
Central Bank in 1983 to finance the purchase of 100,000 shares of
Spendthrift stock. 24 To secure this loan, Casares had pledged the
stock to Central Bank, who was in possession of the certificates."z In
1988, after Leslie Combs settled the claims of all plaintiffs, including
Casares, for $2.1 million, 126 Central Bank asserted a priority claim
upon Casares' share of the settlement funds as proceeds of the
Spendthrift stock.127 Casares' lawyers, who claimed an attorneys' lien
against the settlement fund, objected on the ground that there had been
no disposition of the stock.' 28 The district court ruled in favor of
Central Bank, 29 and the Ninth Circuit affinrned the judgment in a
decision that squarely rejects the passage of title conception of
proceeds:
[Casares' lawyers argue] that there has been no "sale, exchange,
collection or other disposition of collateral," and that the terms of the
statute therefore have not been met. If the purpose of the statute is to be
served, however, the security-holder must be protected against
diminutions in the value of the security that arise not only from sale,
but also from other events or transactions that damage the security.
The classic situation is that of a tort recovery obtained by a debtor for
damage to secured property; the secured creditor obtains a lien on such
a payment to replace the diminished value of the security. There has
been no sale, and no alteration in ownership, but in a broad sense there
has been a,130
"disposition" of which the tort recovery represents the
",proceeds."
Since the settlement compensated Casares for the lost economic
value of the Spendthrift stock, the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded
that Central Bank retained
a lien upon the settlement payments as
3
'
stock.1
that
of
proceeds

124. Id. at 827.
125. I

126. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, there was no rescission of the
original stock purchase, so the plaintiffs retained their Spendthrift shares. Id. Since the
plaintiffs retained their shares, the settlement payments would not constitute proceeds under
the passage of title conception.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id
130. Id at 828 (citations omitted).
131. Id
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Ill. THE TRUE SCOPE OF "PROCEEDS" AND THE "NONEXISTENT
COLLATERAL" PROBLEM

A.

Introducingthe Nonexistent CollateralProblem

Another set of proceeds cases exists in which courts also have
construed Section 9-306(1) narrowly and in a fashion inconsistent
with the emerging, value-based conception of the term. These cases
involve the "nonexistent collateral" problem, demonstrated by the
following hypothetical:
ABC Company (ABC) manufactures and sells widgets to retailers
only on open account. ABC finances its operations through a $1
million line of credit obtained from FirstBank. To secure this line of
credit, FirstBank takes and duly perfects a first priority security interest
upon ABC's accounts receivable. Shortly thereafter, XYZ Company
(XYZ), ABC's primary competitor in the widget business, offers ABC
$1 million to stop manufacturing and selling widgets. ABC accepts the
payment and closes its plant.
ABC's action in closing its plant has an apparent negative effect
upon FirstBank's bargained-for collateral, since ABC no longer
generates any accounts. Therefore, FirstBank might attempt to claim
an interest in the $1 million that XYZ paid to ABC, arguing that the
payment is proceeds of its bargained-for collateral (ABC's accounts).
This argument is plausible in an economic sense because the $1
million payment, in part, is a substitute for the net present value of
future accounts that ABC would have generated had it continued
operating. Since FirstBank would have possessed a security interest
in those future accounts, FirstBank might argue that it should have a
continuing lien upon the $1 million payment ABC received to cease
operations.
A narrow reading of Section 9-306(1), however, presents what
appears to be a threshold problem. How can an asset (the $1 million
cash payment) be proceeds of collateral that never came into existence
(the accounts that ABC would have generated if it had not closed)?
This is the nonexistent collateral dilemma, which has surfaced in
judicial decisions in several different contexts, including disputes over
government agricultural subsidy payments and proceeds of business
interruption insurance.
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Governmental Agricultural Subsidies

During the past dozen years, perhaps the most widely litigated
proceeds issue has been whether a security interest in crops extends
to government agricultural subsidy payments received by the debtor.
Most of the cases have involved payments received by debtors under
the federal payment-in-kind (PIK) agricultural subsidy program.'32
Under the PIK program, farmers can agree with the government not
to plant certain designated crops on a certain percentage of their
acreage.133 Once the farmer agrees to divert those acres, the fanner
must maintain that acreage under conservation measures approved
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 34 In exchange for
this diversion, the USDA agrees to pay the farmer, either in kind or
in certificate form, a fixed amount of
the foregone crop equal to the
35
expected yield of the diverted land.
By participating in the PIK program, the farmer's agreement to
divert acreage becomes a valuable asset that the farmer can sell or use
as collateral. 36 The widespread use of PIK contracts in this fashion
created numerous priority conflicts between farm lenders claiming a
security interest in crops and either (a) the bankrupt farmer (or the
bankruptcy trustee) or (b) a subsequent creditor claiming a direct
security interest in the right to payment under the PIK contract. To
obtain priority as to the PIK payments, the crop lender would have to
demonstrate that the PIK payments are identifiable proceeds of the
crops in which the crop lender possessed a duly perfected security
37
interest.
132. For a basic overview of federal agricultural subsidy programs and some of the
pitfalls associated with using subsidy payments as collateral, see Steven C. Turner &
Dawnvolynn D. Callahan, The Nature, Treatment,and Classificationof Security Interests in
Government Farm Payment Programsand Related Issues, 10 J. AGmic. TAx'N & L. 195,
203-15 (1988).
133. ld. at 199.
134. In re Schmidt, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 589,590 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984).
135. Id.
136. 2 QuN, supranote 14, 9-306[A][17], at 9-315.
137. The farm lender, of course, could have simply included PIK contract rights

within the original collateral, thereby obviating the need to rely upon § 9-306(1)'s proceeds
coverage. Many courts have concluded that the farm lender's failure to do so means that the
farm lender took no security interest in PIK contract rights. E.g., In re Schmaling, 783 F.2d
680, 684 (7th Cir. 1986). This argument is subject to the identical criticism leveled earlier at
the ClearyBrothers case-the failure of the farm lender to take a direct security interest in
the PIK contract rights has nothing to do with whether those rights are properly.
characterized as proceeds of the farmer's crops. See supranote 71.

HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 677 1994-1995

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

A substantial number of courts held that crop lenders could not
overcome the nonexistent collateral problem, concluding that PIK
payments could not be considered proceeds of crops when the farmer
never planted that crop. 3 8 The leading case adopting this position is
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
3 9 The debtors in Schmaling were Illinois
Circuit in In re Schmaling.1
farmers who granted a security interest in 1982 to First National Bank
of Freeport (FNB) covering all "'crops grown or growing ... and
which are now located on the [debtors'] real estate... together with all
property of a similar nature or kind ... which may be hereafter
acquired." ' 1 ° In 1983, the debtors entered into a PIK contract entitling
them to a total of 35,772 bushels of surplus corn. 14 1 The debtors used
the rights under this PIK contract as collateral to obtain additional
operating loans and supplies from parties other than FNB.' 42
In March 1984, the debtors filed for bankruptcy. 43 When FNB
asserted a continuing security interest in the debtors' PIK corn, the
debtors filed an adversary proceeding seeking a judgment that FNB
possessed no such security interest.' 44 In a decision affirmed by the
district court, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of FNB, stating that
"'although the agreement did not contemplate the not-as-yetcommenced Payment-in-Kind program and its proceeds specifically,
its coverage was intended to be broad so as [to] cover all of the
debtor's farm-related assets.""145 The Seventh Circuit reversed,
however, rejecting FNB's argument that the PIK payments were
proceeds of the crops described in FNB's security agreement."

138. See, e.g., In re Kingsley, 865 F.2d 975,979 (8th Cir. 1989); Schmaling, 783 F.2d
at 683; In re Sunberg, 729 F.2d 561, 562 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Clark, 82 B.R. 131, 133
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1987); United States v. Carolina E. Chem. Co., 638 R Supp. 521, 524-25
(D.S.C. 1986); In re Mattick, 45 B.R. 615, 617 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Binning, 45
B.R. 9, 12 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); In re Liebe, 41 B.R. 965, 967-68 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1984); In re Fowler, 41 B.R. 962, 963-64 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); In re Schmidt, 38 B.R.
380, 383 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984); Fayette County Farms v. Vandalia Farms, 521 N.E.2d 300,
302 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
139. 783 E2d 680.
140. Id. at 681 (quoting the security agreement entered into by the debtors).
141. Idl
142. Id
143. Id
144. Id. at 681-82.
145. Id. at 682 (quoting the holding of the bankruptcy court).
146. Id. at 682-84.
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As the language of its opinion demonstrates, the Schmaling court
was troubled by the nonexistent collateral problem:
For something to .be "proceeds" of crops ... it must be received

upon their "sale, exchange, collection or other disposition." But in the
instant case there was never a crop of which to dispose. No corn was
grown on the Schmalings' real estate. One condition for participating
in the PIK program was that individuals not plant a crop.
As a147consequence... inkind payments do not constitute proceeds of
crops.
FNB attempted to address the nonexistent collateral problem by
arguing that (a) the debtors would have grown corn but for their
participation in the PIK program; (b) the corn, had the debtors grown
it, would have been covered by FNB's security interest; and (c) the
PIK corn was just a substitute for the diverted crop and thus should
be treated as proceeds within the spirit of Section 9-306(1)."48 The
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that this argument possessed
economic force, especially considering the structure of the PIK
program. 49 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit refused to budge from
taking a narrow view of the term "disposition," holding that the PIK
crops were not from the farmers' own land and that "the broad
economics of the transaction [should not] override the plain
language of a security agreement which extends only to crops [and]
... clear deficiencies in the description of the collateral."' 5

2.

Business Interruption Insurance Payments

The nonexistent collateral problem also arises in cases
involving business interruption insurance moneys. Suppose that
ABC Company (ABC), which sells fuel oil, obtains financing from
FirstBank. To secure this financing, ABC grants FirstBank a first
priority floating lien upon ABC's accounts and general intangibles.
147. Il at 682-83 (citations omitted).
148. Id.
149. The Schmaling court stated:
This argument has a certain appeal from an economic perspective since the
government based its PIK calculations on the farmer's past and anticipated yields
and intended the program to reduce production of certain crops. This appeal is
perhaps even greater where the farmer is paid in the commodity he would have
planted.
Id at 683 (citation omitted).
150. Id
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A neighboring landowner then undertakes major construction
adjacent to ABC's plant, during which a third party negligently
damages ABC's pipelines. The damage effectively puts ABC out of
business for several months and forces ABC into a Chapter 11
proceeding. As a result of the damage, ABC collects $130,000
under the terms of an insurance policy that covers ABC against
losses suffered due to business interruption. Are the $130,000
unencumbered funds available for ABC's use in its reorganization?
Or does FirstBank have a secured claim against the $130,000 as
proceeds of its collateral under Section 9-306(1)?
Clearly, FirstBank cannot argue that the claim against ABC's
business interruption insurer is a general intangible directly covered by
its security agreement. As Section 9-104(g) makes clear, and as
numerous courts have recognized, any transfer by ABC of a claim
against its insurer falls outside the scope of Article 9.15' FirstBank
might claim, however, that the insurance moneys are a substitute for
ABC's goodwill or for the accounts and contract rights that ABC
would have generated but for the business interruption. Under this
rationale, FirstBank might argue that the insurance moneys are
derivative proceeds of FirstBank's collateral within the proper scope of
Section 9-306(1).
Based upon the nonexistent collateral problem, however, one
bankruptcy court recently rejected the argument that a creditor such as
FirstBank could claim a lien upon the insurance moneys. In In re
Kroehler Cabinet Co.,15 2 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Missouri stated:
151. See U.C.C. § 9-104(g) (1990) (providing that "[tihis Article does not apply ...
to a transfer of an interest in or claim in or under any policy of insurance, except as provided
with respect to proceeds (Section 9-306) and priorities in proceeds (Section 9-312)"); see,
e.g., In re Kroehler Cabinet Co., 129 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (stating that the
transfer of an interest or claim in any insurance policy is beyond the scope of Article 9),
rev'd sub nom, MNC Commercial Corp. v. Rouse, No. 91-0615-CV-W-2, 1992 WL
674733 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 1992). As such, a creditor can only obtain a lien upon an
insurance policy under non-Article 9 law, typically by having the creditor named as a loss
payee under the policy.
Just as Article 9's exclusion of tort claims as collateral may change, see supra note 117
and accompanying text, so may Article 9's current exclusion of insurance policies as
collateral. The PEB Report recommended that "[t]he Drafting Committee should give
serious consideration to revising § 9-104(g) to expand the scope of Article 9 to include
security interests in most forms of business insurance policies." PEB REPOR, supra note
15, at 56.
152. 129 B.R. 191.
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[T]he proceeds from the Business Interruption Policy were not
insurance proceeds resulting from the destruction of [the debtor's]
equipment, work-in-process, inventory or personal property. Rather,
they were paid as the result of actual loss of business income [that the
debtor] sustained due to the necessary suspension of its operations.
Thus, the proceeds paid from the Business Interruption Policy were not
derivative proceeds under Section 9-306(1)153 because they were not paid
as the result of damage to [the] collateral.
Also relying upon the nonexistent collateral problem, another
bankruptcy court stated that "in the case of business interruption
insurance, the policy does not insure any of the creditor's collateral;
it simply insures the debtor against interruption of its business.' 154
B.

Debunking the Nonexistent CollateralProblem

To see courts embrace the nonexistent collateral theory in
interpreting Section 9-306(1) is to watch history repeat itself.
Decades ago, courts sacrificed potential advances in commercial
finance by adhering formalistically to the axiom qui non habet, ille
non dat ("what one does not have, one cannot give"). Of course, this
axiom expresses a useful, common-sense limitation upon a person's
ability to convey property rights. Many courts took this notion far
beyond its sensible application, however, invoking the axiom as a
basis for concluding that one cannot convey or assign things
expected to be owned in the future, but not yet owned or in
existence. 155 This reasoning reached its zenith/nadir in the decision
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Taylor v. BartonChild Co.16 In Taylor, the court struck down a simple floating lien
against a debtor's accounts, holding that a creditor could not enforce
a debtor's assignment of future accounts against the trustee in

153. l at 195.
154. In reInvestment &Tax Servs., 148 B.R. 571,574 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992).
155. E.g., Skipper v. Stokes, 42 Ala. 255, 258 (1868) (accounts); Durant v. D'Auxy,
33 S.E. 478, 481 (Ga. 1899) (tangible property); Ainsworth v. Mobile Fruit & Trading Co.,
29 S.E. 142, 142 (Ga.1897) (accounts); Taylor v. Barton-Child Co., 117 N.E. 43, 44 (Mass.
1917) (accounts); First Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Campbell, 193 S.W. 197, 198-99 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1917) (accounts); Huling, Brockerhoff & Co. v. Cabell, 9 W. Va. 522, 527-28 (1876)
(accounts); O'Niel v. Helmike, 102 N.W 573, 574 (Wis. 1905) (accounts).
156. 117 N.E. 43.
HeinOnline -- 69 Tul. L. Rev. 681 1994-1995

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

bankruptcy. 117 The Taylor opinion included the following assertions,
clearly outmoded by today's standards:
There can be no present conveyance or transfer of property not in
existence, or of property not in the possession of the seller to which he
has no title....
There is an exception at the common law to the effect that one may
sell that in which he has a potential title although not present actual
possession .... That principle of the common law has never been
carried so far as to include the case at bar. The catch of fish expected
to be made upon a voyage about to begin cannot be sold. There can be
no sale of the wool of sheep, the crop of a field, or the increase of herds
not owned but to be bought, and there can be no assignment of wages
to be earned
under -a contract of employment to be made in the
58
future.

These assertions were outmoded even when the Taylor court
made them in 1917. As Professors Gilmore and Kripke recognized,
the business financing community chose to use future receivables of
the manufacturer, the dealer, and the service provider as collateral
because those receivables were similar to fixed, long-term assets
well-suited for business financing. 159 Under re-U.C.C. accounts
receivable financing, the parties expected that the debtor would
conduct future operations and generate future revenues, to which the
secured party's lien would attach. The Taylor court's invocation of
the qui non habet axiom merely served to defeat the ex ante bargain
of debtors and creditors.
As a result, the rationale of decisions lke Taylor lacked longterm staying power. In time, case law might have recognized, "by
analogy to the common law doctrine of potential possession, the
effectiveness of present assignments of the future receivables of a
going enterprise."'' ° Legislative reform short-circuited the common
law process, however, and expressly sanctioned the use of afteracquired property as collateral. The current version of this legislative
reform is Article 9, which rejects the nonexistent collateral problem by

157. Il at 44.

158. Id. at43-44 (citations omitted).

159. 1 GRANT GLMORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS INPERsONAL PROPErY § 7.11, at 236
(1965); Homer Kripke, CurrentAssets Financing as a Source of Long-Term Capital, 36
MINN.

L. REv. 506,510-13 (1952).

160. GMLoRE, supra note 159, § 7.11, at 238.
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stating that "any and all obligations covered by the security agreement
[may] be secured by after-acquired collateral. 16'
The use by modem courts of the nonexistent collateral concept to
decide the PIK and business interruption cases is as formalistic as the
Taylor decision. As discussed below, use of the nonexistent collateral
problem to limit the scope of the term "proceeds" under Section 9306(1) merely frustrates the ex ante bargain of the reasonable debtor
and secured party.
1.

PIK Payments as Proceeds of Crops
a.

The Proper Interpretation of Section 9-306(1) as Applied
to PIK Payments

In the PIK cases, the ex ante expectations of the parties are
relatively clear. Assume Secured Party has just accepted an interest
in Debtor's as-yet unplanted corn crop as security for a loan. An
objective observer, looking at the security agreement, would
conclude that Debtor and Secured Party share a mutual
understanding: Debtor will plant and grow corn to which Secured
Party's interest will attach.
If Debtor carries out this expectation, there is no question about
the validity of Secured Party's interest in Debtor's com harvest. But
what if Debtor does not carry out this expectation and instead
exchanges her rights to plant corn for a PIK contract that pays her not
to plant corn? In that case, the Debtor effectively has liquidated the
bargained-for collateral, just as if Debtor in fact had grown the corn,
harvested it, and then sold it for cash. Just as security law would treat
the cash proceeds of Debtor's corn harvest as proceeds of the corn,
security law should likewise treat the PIK contract as proceeds of the
bargained-for collateral. Applying the nonexistent collateral rule to
prevent this result frustrates the ex ante bargain of the parties and
accords Debtor a windfall.
While most federal courts have failed to acknowledge this
point, 62 many state court decisions and a few well-reasoned federal
court decisions have determined that sound commercial policy dictates

161. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1990).
162. See supranote 138 and accompanying text.
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that PIK payments be classified as proceeds under Section 9-306(1).163
The decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Sweetwater Production
Credit Ass'n v. O'Briant" is typical of these cases. In O'Briant,
Sweetwater Production Credit Association (PCA) held a duly
perfected security interest in the debtor's crops. 165 Subsequently,
O'Briant, the debtor's father-in-law, loaned the debtor additional
funds, taking a security interest in the debtor's PIK cotton. 166 After
default by the debtor, both PCA and O'Briant claimed priority against
the PIK cotton. 67 O'Briant claimed that the debtor's PIK entitlements
were "general intangibles" against which PCA at best possessed an
unperfected security interest, due to its failure to file a financing
statement in the secretary of state's office.168 PCA argued that the PIK
cotton constituted proceeds of the debtor's crops,
in which PCA
169
possessed an unquestionably perfected prior lien.
In a unanimous opinion, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the
split of authority and concluded that ''the better reasoned view is the
170
one that classifies PIK contracts within the definition of proceeds.'
The court dismissed the nonexistent collateral problem, instead
focusing upon the ex ante bargain of the parties as the key to
classification under Section 9-306(1). As the court recognized,
treating PIK contracts as proceeds of crops "effects the intent of the
parties as the PIK contracts are merely substitutes for the crops that
otherwise would have been planted.''
The O'Briant court further
justified its construction of Section 9-306(1) as a means to prevent
debtors from taking opportunistic action to defeat bargained-for

163. In re Patsantaras Land & Livestock Co., 60 B.R. 24, 25 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986);
Osteroos v. Norwest Bank Minot, N.A., 604 R Supp. 848, 849 (D.N.D. 1984); In re Judkins,
41 B.R. 369, 372 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Cupp, 38 B.R. 953, 955 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1984); In re Lee, 35 B.R. 663, 667 (Bank. N.D. Ohio 1983); Production Credit Ass'n
v. Martin County Nat'l Bank, 384 N.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Farmers &
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Sooner Coop., 766 P.2d 325, 327-28 (Okla. 1988); Sweetwater
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. O'Briant, 764 S.W.2d 230,232 (Tex. 1988).
164. 764 S.W.2d 230.
165. d. at 230.
166. Id. at231.
167. Id.
168. Id
169. Id
170. Id at 232.
171. Id.
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security interests by entering into PIK contracts instead of planting
2
crops.

17

b.

An Aside: Negotiable and Quasi-Negotiable Proceeds

Certainly, the O'Briant court's interpretation of Section 9306(1) is more consistent with the expected ex ante bargain of the
reasonable debtor and secured party than the interpretation set forth
in Schmaling and its progeny. Likewise, the O'Briant court's
construction of Section 9-306(1) is more faithful to the U.C.C.'s
directive in Section 1-102(1) that the U.C.C. be "liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."173 This
does not mean, however, that the end result in the O'Briantcasethat PCA prevailed over the subsequent secured party-was the
desirable or correct result. In a case like O'Briant,Article 9 should
172. Id. Other courts likewise have embraced the policy justification for the O'Briant
case, noting that "[a] flexible interpretation of the concept 'proceeds' promotes responsible
management of farming operations by allowing alternatives to growing crops while
simultaneously protecting creditors' security interests." In re Judkins, 41 B.R. 369, 373
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Sooner Coop., 766 P.2d
325, 328 (Okla. 1988) (quoting Judkins,41 B.R. at 373).
The Seventh Circuit in Schmaling failed to give due consideration to this "antiopportunism" policy. Notably, the district court in the Schmaling case had agreed with
O'Briant'srationale, concluding that .'[i]f PIK payments were not proceeds, a farmer could
abandon all farning activities in favor of program participation, thereby allowing him to
dissipate the proceeds of the programs without any regard for his creditors' interests."' In re
Schmaling, 783 E2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting the district court's unpublished
opinion). The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, however, stating that "[t]his argument
can be made anytime a farmer finds a substitute use of his land, such as using his fields for a
rock concert or a fairground instead of for the growing of crops. Clearly, income derived
from such alternative uses could not be considered crop proceeds." Id
The Seventh Circuit's argument proves too much, however. If the debtor uses his fields
for a rock concert or a fairground, then the debtor is not acting as a farmer. Farmers do not
stage rock concerts or fairs; farmers operate farms on which they grow crops. If the debtor
rents his fields for a rock concert, one examining the security agreement, which describes
crops, cannot reasonably conclude that rational persons in the positions of debtor and
secured party would have understood that the rents would be covered by the security
agreement (assuming that the agreement covers only crops, and not the land itself). Thus,
the secured party should receive no continuing lien upon those rents.
Farmers who receive PIK payments, however, are still acting as farmers, albeit ones
who have agreed contractually to leave a portion of their acreage out of production. In
exchange for the agreement not to grow corn, the government agrees to provide the farmer
with surplus com. After examining the security agreement, one would conclude that a
reasonable debtor and secured party would have understood that this surplus corn fits within
the bundle of collateral granted to the secured party.
173. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1990); see supranote 89 and accompanying text.
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provide a negotiability rule that enables the second secured party (the
father-in-law) to prevail over the first secured party (PCA),
notwithstanding Section 9-306(1)'s continuing proceeds coverage.
There are certain assets that, if left in the possession of the debtor,
give third parties the appearance that the debtor can pass good title to
those assets. Cash is the clearest example. Suppose that Debtor sells
Secured Party's collateral for cash and then uses those cash proceeds to
purchase a machine from X. Since those cash proceeds are negotiable,
the common law does not allow Secured Party to reclaim the cash
proceeds from X, even though the cash might be identifiable proceeds
of the collateral under Section 9-306(2) and even though Secured Party
may have a perfected security interest in those proceeds under Section
9-306(3). 11 4 The common law doctrine of negotiability of money,
which the U.C.C. apparently embraces,175 allows third parties such as
174. The common law conception of negotiability of money is commonly associated
with the ancient case of Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758), in which the court
held that money cannot be recovered from "the hands of a person who bona fide took it in
the course of currency, and in the way of his business." Id. at 402; accord Holly v.
Missionary Soc'y of Protestant Episcopal Church, 180 U.S. 284, 294 (1901); In re Brainard
Hotel Co., 75 F.2d 481, 482 (2d Cir. 1935); Arlington Park Racetrack v. SRM Computers,
674 F. Supp. 986, 992 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Long, 318 F Supp. 156,
160 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Porter v. Beha, 8 F2d 65, 74 (D.N.Y. 1925), aff'd, 12 F.2d 513 (2d
Cir. 1926); Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Lamson, 90 Ill. App. 18, 20 (App. Ct. 1900);
First Nat'l Bank v. Gibert & Clay, 123 La. 845, 852-53, 49 So. 593, 596 (1909); Babcock v.
Standish, 33 A. 385, 387-88 (N.J. Eq. 1895); Newhall v. Longacre Bank, 162 N.E. 23, 23
(N.Y. 1928); Stephens v. Board of Educ., 79 N.Y. 183, 186-88 (1879); Matteawan Mfg. Co.
v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 279 N.Y.S. 495, 502 (App. Div. 1935), modified, 3 N.E.2d
845 (N.Y 1936); City of Portland v. Berry, 739 P.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Or. Ct. App. 1987);
Steve H. Nickles & Edward S. Adams, Tracing Proceeds to Attorneys' Pockets (and the
Dilemma of Payingfor Bankruptcy), 78 MINN. L. REv. 1079, 1134-42 (1994) (discussing
the common law rule of negotiability).
175. No courts seem to have suggested that Article 9 had the effect of displacing the
common law rules concerning the negotiability of money. Further, the official comments
seem to indicate that the drafters understbod that the U.C.C. would not displace the common
law negotiability of money. See UCC § 9-306 cmt. 2(c) (1990) ("Where cash proceeds are
covered into the debtor's checking account and paid out in the operation of the debtor's
business, recipients of the funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party
may have in them as proceeds."). The PEB Report nevertheless recommended the revision
of the official comments to make this understanding explicit:
The official comments to § 9-306 should be revised to reflect that Article 9 does
not displace non-UCC rules of negotiability and finality of payment that otherwise
would apply to cash proceeds and funds paid from a deposit account constituting
proceeds. The revised comments should indicate that a good faith purchaser of
cash proceeds or of funds transferred or paid from a deposit account constituting
cash proceeds takes free of security interests to the same extent that the purchaser
would take free of other competing claims.
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X to rely safely upon Debtor's possession of cash as a sufficient
indicator of Debtor's capacity to convey good title.
Likewise, the same result would occur if Debtor had sold the
collateral in exchange for a negotiable instrument that Debtor had in
turn negotiated to X. Even though the negotiable instrument would be
identifiable proceeds of Secured Party's collateral under Section 9306(2), X would prevail over the Secured Party in a priority contest.176
Effectively, the U.C.C. makes a policy judgment, based upon common
commercial practice, that the law should protect subsequent
purchasers like X with a negotiability rule in order to facilitate
commerce in such assets. 177 As a result, if Secured Party wants to
prevent Debtor from effectively disposing of negotiable proceeds of its
collateral, Secured Party must take possession of those proceeds.
Other assets carry an aura of "quasi-negotiability." If Debtor had
sold the collateral in exchange for a nonnegotiable promissory note,
that "instrument,' 178 would constitute proceeds of Secured Party's
collateral, and the Secured Party would obtain a continuing security
interest in the note under Section 9-306(2). 171 IfDebtor retains
possession of the note, however, and transfers it to X to purchase a
machine or some other asset, X likely will prevail in a priority contest
with Secured Party.80 Likewise, if Debtor had sold the collateral and
received both a note and security agreement, collectively treated as

PEB REPORT, supranote 15, at 120.
176. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (1990) (providing that nothing in Article 9 limits the rights
of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument to enforce that instrument and that the
rights of a holder in due course take priority over prior perfected security interests).
177. See, e.g., 2 JAMES J.WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 24-12, at 349-50 (practitioner's 3d ed. 1988) (suggesting that free transfer of
negotiable instruments would be impaired "if every transferee were obliged to check the
filings every time he took such an instrument").
178. Article 9 defines "instrument" as any "writing which evidences a right to the
payment of money.. .and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by
delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment," regardless of whether the writing
itself is negotiable. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(i) (1990).
179. See icL § 9-306(2).
180. See id. § 9-308(a) (providing that the purchaser of an instrument "who gives
new value and takes possession of' an instrument in the ordinary course of business takes
priority over a competing proceeds security interest under § 9-306 if the purchaser lacks
knowledge of the competing security interest); see also id. § 9-308(b) (providing that the
purchaser of an instrument that is proceeds of inventory and "who gives new value and takes
possession of' an instrument in the ordinary course of business takes priority under § 9-306
over a competing proceeds security interest regardless of the purchaser's knowledge).
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"chattel paper,"181 Secured Party would obtain a continuing security
interest in the chattel paper under Section 9-306(2).182 Nevertheless, if
Debtor retains possession of the chattel paper, and transfers it to X to
purchase a machine or some other asset, X again will usually prevail in
a priority dispute with Secured Party.183 Here too, the U.C.C. makes a
policy judgment that a debtor's possession of quasi-negotiable assets
usually justifies a third party purchaser's reliance upon the appearance
that the debtor can transfer good title to those assets. 84
The U.C.C.'s treatment of cash, instruments, and chattel paper
stands in stark contrast to its treatment of "nonnegotiable" collateral
such as accounts. Purchasers of accounts generally do not receive the
benefit of the negotiability rules accorded to purchasers of cash,
instruments, and chattel paper. 85 Thus, if Debtor had sold Secured
Party's collateral in exchange for an account, and had transferred the
account to X to purchase some other asset, X would not prevail over
Secured Party in a priority dispute.
To the extent that PIK certificates are conceptually and practically
similar to quasi-negotiable collateral, Article 9 should cloak them with
an aura of negotiability. The federal statute governing annual
agricultural commodity programs specifies that the USDA may make
in-kind payments by the issuance of "negotiable certificates"
redeemable for a commodity. 86 The statute's use of the term
"negotiable" is instructive, suggesting that Congress envisioned that
PIK certificates would need to be accepted essentially as cash
181. Article 9 defines "chattel paper" as "a writing or writings which evidence both a
monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods." U.C.C. § 9105(1)(b) (1990).
182. See id § 9-306(2).
183. See supra note 180.
184. As White and Summers have suggested:
In effect, the drafters have judged that businessmen and lenders should be
permitted to purchase chattel paper without having first to examine the files-at
least in cases in which they put out new money, take possession and conduct the
transaction in the ordinary course of their business. The [U.C.C.] thus
accommodates the business expectation of quasi-negotiability--the expectation
by businessmen that one who "buys" such paper in ignorance of others' claims
and takes possession of it has a first claim to the paper.
2 WHrrE & SUMMERS, supranote 177, § 26-18, at 550; see also 2 GILMORE,supranote 159,
§ 25.5, at 669 ("Chattel paper, it was felt, had become a sort of commercial specialty and
had traveled a good part of the familiar road toward negotiability.").
185. See 2 WHITE & SumMERS, supra note 177, § 26-18, at 548.
186. 7 U.S.C. § 1445k(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
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equivalents to serve their intended function. The language of the
statute reinforces this notion, permitting the USDA to make payments
by any method that the USDA "determines appropriate to enable the
producer to receive payments in an efficient, equitable, and
expeditious manner so as to ensure that the producer receives the same
total return as if the payments had been made in cash." 187 Consistently
with Congress's apparent desires, those engaged in agricultural
commerce and lending have treated PIK certificates substantially as
cash equivalents.'
In the O'Briant case, the debtor's possession of the PIK
certificates communicated to the father-in-law the impression that the
debtor could freely transfer the PIK certificates.18 9 Under those
circumstances, security law should provide a negotiability rule to
protect the third-party purchaser.Y° Ideally, then, the father-in-law in
O'Briant should have prevailed-not because the PIK certificates
were not proceeds, as some have suggested,' 9' but because the fatherin-law should have taken the certificates free and clear of PCA's
security interest.
187. Id § 1445k(b)(4).

188. In re Halls, 79 B.R. 417, 421 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987) (recognizing the
importance of "the transferability of certificates [in] ...the regulatory scheme in question"
and the development of a market for those certificates); accord In re George, 85 B.R. 133,
143-44 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988) (noting the similarities between PIK certificates and cash),
aff'd, 119 B.R. 800 (D. Kan. 1990).
189. Sweetwater Prod. Credit Ass'n v. O'Briant, 764 S.W.2d 230,231 (rex. 1988).
190. While security law should protect a bona fide third party purchaser of PIK
certificates against a secured party claiming an interest in the PIK certificates as proceeds,
security law would not and should not protect the bankruptcy trustee in the same situation.
Under Bankruptcy Code § 544(a), the bankruptcy trustee does not assume the status of a
bona fide purchaser of the debtor's assets; instead, the trustee assumes only the status of a
lien creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988). As long as the secured party's interest in
proceeds remains perfected under § 9-306(3), the secured party would prevail over the
trustee. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1990). Thus, in those cases when the debtor files
bankruptcy but has not transferred its PIK rights to a third party purchaser, the secured party
should have priority in the PIK rights under § 9-306. E.g., In re Kingsley, 865 E2d 975,
979 (8th Cir. 1989).
191. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
192. It is doubtful whether the current language of Article 9 can accomplish this
result. One might argue that PIK certificates constitute "instruments" under § 9-105(i)
because that term includes not only Article 3 negotiable instruments but also "any other
writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and is not itself a security
agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by
delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(i) (1990).
Certainly, PIK certificates are ordinarily transferred by delivery with a restrictive
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Business Interruption Insurance Payments as Proceeds of a
Debtor's Accounts and General Intangibles

The ex ante understanding of Debtor and Secured Party also is
relatively clear in business interruption cases. If Secured Party takes
a floating lien upon Debtor's accounts and general intangibles, that
contract essentially grants Secured Party a lien upon Debtor's
business revenues. An objective observer looking at the security
agreement would conclude that Debtor and Secured Party understand
and expect that Debtor will continue to operate and generate
accounts and other intangible rights to which Secured Party's lien
will attach. If Debtor carries out this expectation, there is no
question about the validity of Secured Party's interest in Debtor's
business revenues.
But suppose Debtor cannot carry out this expectation due to some
intervening force. This intervening force effectively deprives Secured
Party of some portion of the collateral for which it bargained-the
future revenues Debtor would have generated but for the interruption.
If this loss is uninsured, Secured Party bears the risk of Debtor's
insolvency, as would be true if Debtor suffered damage to uninsured
tangible collateral. If the loss is insured, however, the business
interruption case is functionally analogous to the casualty insurance
cases discussed in Part II.T9 The purpose of business interruption
endorsement. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 770.4(c) (1988) (specifying transfer requirements under
prior regulations).
The problem, however, is that PIK certificates are not necessarily payable in money,
even if they are intended to function essentially as a cash equivalent. As a consequence,
most courts have concluded that PIK certificates are either Article 9 "accounts" or "general
intangibles." E.g., In re Schmaling, 783 F2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1986); In re George, 85
B.R. 133, 145 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988), aff'd, 119 B.R. 800 (D. Kan. 1990); In re Clark, 82
B.R. 131, 132-33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987); In re Lion Farms, Inc., 54 B.R. 241, 244-45
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1985), aff'd, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1212 (D. Kan. 1987); In
re Binning, 45 B.R. 9, 12 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); In re Schmidt, 38 B.R. 380,383 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1984); In re Sunberg, 35 B.R. 777,781-82 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1983), aff'd, 729 R2d
561 (8th Cir. 1984). Likewise, the PEB Report recommended that the Drafting Committee
give "serious consideration" to defining government subsidies as general intangibles under
§ 9-106. PEB REPORT, supranote 15, at 182-83.
The result of this classification, however, is that PIK certificates will not fall within the
quasi-negotiability rules established in § 9-308 for instruments and chattel paper. If PIK
certificates are truly quasi-negotiable collateral, then the Drafting Committee should either
revise § 9-105(1)(i) to include them within the definition of instrument, or revise § 9-308 to
include PIK certificates within that section's negotiability rule.
193. See supra part II.B.1.
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insurance is to protect the insured party against a loss of prospective
earnings due to a business interruption. 94 As such, business
interruption insurance payments are derivative of and a substitute for
the accounts and intangibles that Debtor would have generated but for
the interruption. Since Secured Party's lien would have covered those
accounts and intangible rights directly, security law should treat the
195
insurance moneys as proceeds of Secured Party's collateral.
As the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri recognized in MNC Commercial Corp. v. Rouse, applying
the nonexistent collateral concept to prevent this result frustrates the ex
ante bargain of the parties and accords the debtor a windfall.196 In
MNC Commercial Corp., which reversed the bankruptcy court
decision in Kroehler Cabinet, 97 the court addressed and squarely
rejected the nonexistent collateral doctrine:
The Trustee[] argu[es] ...that the business interruption proceeds

did not replace any existing collateral because Kroehler did not
continue it's [sic] business, and therefore, lost the ability to generate
income. The Trustee's [argument] is without merit. The precise
purpose of a Business Interruption Policy is to compensate an insured
for lost business income because the insured is unable to produce
income from it's [sic] own operations. There is no real distinction
between business income generated from normal operations and
insurance proceeds paid to198replace lost business income under a
Business Interruption Policy.

MNC Commercial Corp. thus neatly demonstrates how a court
should apply Section 9-306(1) in a manner consistent with the
U.C.C.'s primary rules of construction and in a fashion consistent
with the proper economic conception of the term "proceeds."
194. Quality Molding Co. v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 272 E2d 779,780 (7th Cir.
1959).
195. David B. Young, The Rights of Secured Creditors to the Proceeds of Business
InterruptionInsurance Under UCC Article 9, 26 UCC L.L 204, 229 (1994) (recognizing

that the subject matter of Secured Party's lien in this example would be "identical to the
subject matter of the business interruption policy").
196. No. 91-0615-CV-W-2, 1992 WL 674733, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 1992).
197. 129 B.R. 191 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd sub nom., MNC Commercial Corp.
v. Rouse, No. 91-0615-CV-W-2, 1992 WL 674733 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 1992); see supra
notes 151-153 and accompanying text. The district court's decision in MNC Commercial
Corp. has not been published in any official reporter. This lack of publication is remarkable,
particularly since the question of whether business interruption insurance payments are
proceeds under § 9-306(1) was an issue of first impression in the district courts.
198. MNC Commercial Corp., 1992 WL 674733, at *1 n.3.
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IV. SECTION 9-306, CONCEPTUAL CoHERENCE, AND THE ARTICLE

9

REVisION PROCES

This Article has focused thus far upon the existing version of
Section 9-306(1) and how courts should interpret its definition of
proceeds to carry out the ex ante bargain of the reasonable debtor and
secured party. The history of the casualty insurance cases discussed
in Part H, however, demonstrates that recalcitrant courts often
embrace form over substance in interpreting statutes until the
legislature expressly codifies the substance.199 Since Article 9 is
currently undergoing revision, the drafters should rewrite Section 9306 to codify the proper scope of the term "proceeds." The
following subsections identify the issues crucial to the revision
process.
A.

The PEB Report and Its Recommendations

As noted in Part I, a report commissioned by the U.C.C.'s
Permanent Editorial Board recommended a systematic revision of
Article 9.' ° Several of the recommendations in the PEB Report
attempt to address the proper scope of the term "proceeds." The
PEB Report recognized the crabbed judicial interpretations to which
courts have subjected Section 9-306(1), noting that "the concepts
'sale, exchange, collection or other disposition' found in the current
definition may not be broad enough" to .demonstrate clearly the
proper scope of the term "proceeds. 20' The commentary in the PEB
Report, however, spoke in relatively broad strokes and did not
propose specific amendatory language. Further, the commentary did
not attempt to establish one unifying concept underlying the true
scope of the term "proceeds." In its discussion, the PEB Report
separated the universe of proceeds cases into two categories: the
"exchange
and replacement" cases 02 and the "close association"
3
cases.

20

Within the "exchange and replacement" cases, the PEB Report
placed those transactions in which something is "received in place of
199. See supra part lI.B.1.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
201. PEB REPORT, supranote 15, at 106.
202. Id. at 110-11.
203. Id. at 111.
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and in substitution for the original collateral, which has been disposed
of or reduced in value."2 4 Under this paradigm, the PEB Report
placed the casualty insurance cases, the lease rental cases, cases
involving tort claims and breaches of sales contract warranties, and
205
cases involving a debtor's licensing of intellectual property.
Consistent with PEB Commentary Number 9 and its rejection of the
Cleary Brothers analysis of lease rental payments, 20 6 the PEB Report
recommended revising Section 9-306(1) to make clear that lease
rentals constitute proceeds. 0 7
Likewise, the PEB Report
acknowledged that tort claims and breach of contract warranty claims
"replace[] the value of collateral that would have (or should have)
been available to a secured party" and are thus so "similar to insurance
proceeds" that Section 9-306(1) should treat them as proceeds of the
collateral. °s
Within the "close association" paradigm, the PEB Report placed
cases that it believed did not fit naturally within the exchange and
replacement paradigm. Here, the PEB Report included cases
involving "all forms of distributions on account of securities,
partnrship interests, ... government subsidies, and other payments
that do not involve an 'exchange."' 20 9 In suggesting that these sums
constituted proceeds of collateral, the PEB Report concluded that they
were "so necessarily and obviously associated with an interest in the
original collateral that a security agreement and financing statement
'
ought not to be required to mention them explicitly."21
Without
suggesting precise amendatory language, the PEB Report concluded
that Section 9-306(1) should be "revised so as to embrace this 'close
association' concept. '2

204. Md. at 110.
205. Id. at 110-11.
206. See supranote 86 and accompanying text.
207. PEB REPORT, supranote 15, at 110.
208. Id at 110-11. As to a debtor's licensing of intellectual property, the PEB Report
took no definitive position; it merely stated that "[t)he Drafting Committee should consider
whether to revise the definition to provide that royalties arising out of a debtor's licensing of
intellectual property constitute proceeds of the intellectual property." 142 at 106.
209. d. at 111.
210. Id ("If the debtor, as owner of the collateral, is necessarily entitled to such
property, then a secured party likewise should be entitled to the property as collateral.").
211. Id4
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Toward a Unitary, CoherentConception of Proceeds

By distinguishing between exchange and replacement proceeds
and close association proceeds, the PEB Report creates the
impression that there is no coherent, unified conception that provides
a basis for classifying assets as proceeds. As further discussed
below, this impression is mistaken. In fact, the PEB Report's
definition of close association proceeds--"those things that are so
necessarily and obviously associated with an interest in the original
collateral that a security agreement and financing statement ought
not to be required to mention them explicitly" 2 2 -encompasses all
varieties of proceeds.
1.

Protecting Against Diminishing the Collateral's Economic Value

In any secured transaction, the debtor and secured party bargain
to provide the secured party with a property interest in the debtor's
"collateral." But exactly what is the collateral over which the debtor
and secured party bargained? As security law concerns itself with
interests taken for security purposes, the real subject matter of the
secured transaction is the economic value of the collateral. In order
to respect the expected ex ante bargain of reasonable debtors and
secured parties, security law generally should protect secured parties
against actions and events that effectively reduce the collateral's
economic value.
This proposition is best demonstrated by the normative
assumptions underlying Bankruptcy Code sections 361 through 363,
which address, among other things, a debtor's obligation to provide the
secured party with adequate protection of its security interest.2 3 Under
Section 363(e), a bankruptcy court must prohibit a debtor from using
collateral over the secured party's objection unless the debtor can
provide adequate protection of the secured party's interest.14 If the
debtor's actions or the actions of third parties threaten to reduce the
economic value of the collateral and the secured party objects, Section
363(e) requires the debtor to provide compensation to the secured

212. Id.
213. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-363 (1988).
214. Id. § 363(e).
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party for this reduction.2 5 These normative assumptions also underlie
the current version of U.C.C. section 9-306. As discussed in Part IL
both the 1972 revision to Section 9-306(1) and the 1987 revision to
Section 1-201(37) indicate that proceeds coverage should protect the
secured party against acts or events that exhaust the collateral's
economic value.216

2.

Protecting Against Diminishing the Collateral's Productive
Capacity

Once the inquiry focuses upon economic value as a key to
proceeds classification, one must recognize that a debtor can
consume the value of collateral in different ways. The debtor may
consume the value of collateral via its own direct use (e.g., Cleary
Brothers uses its crane on projects for which it serves as general
contractor), by making the collateral available to third parties for
their use permanently (e.g., Cleary Brothers sells the crane to a
competitor), or by making the collateral available to third parties for
their temporary use (e.g., Cleary Brothers leases the crane to another
contractor for its use on other sites). Stated differently, the debtor's
acquisition of title to the collateral naturally brings with it the
collateral's future productive capacity, which the debtor captures
through using the collateral (either in its own business or by
transferring some or all of that use to third parties). In reality, the
economic value of business collateral is nothing more than the net
present value of what that collateral can produce in the future. 217

Thus, to the extent that Section 9-306's proceeds coverage protects
the secured party against events that exhaust the collateral's

215. See id. § 363. This "adequate protection" most likely would take the form of
cash payments to account for the expected reduction in value, or a replacement lien upon
other unencumbered or underencumbered collateral. See id. § 361(1)-(2); see also United
Sav. Ass'n v. 'limbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 370 (1988) (concluding that
petitioner would be entitled to "cash payments or additional security" for the declining value
of an apartment project); EPTEIN ET AL., supra note 57, § 10-5, at 739 ("Adequate
protection of a security interest in equipment might include insuring equipment, paying

accruing interest or depreciation, and maintaining equipment in good working order.").
216. See supranotes 74-81 and accompanying text.
217. Cf R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism in the
Bankruptcy Courts: Implications for Reforming Commercial Real Estate Finance, 40
UCLA L. REv. 1461, 1501-06, 1532-35 (1993) (stating that the value of commercial real
estate development reflects the net present value of its future productive capacity).
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economic value, that coverage is incomplete unless it also addresses
the exhaustion of the collateral's productive capacity.
This proposition is demonstrated most clearly by the normative
assumptions underlying Bankruptcy Code section 552(b):
(1) ...[I]f the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement
before the commencement of the case and if the security interest
created by such security agreement extends to property of the debtor
acquired before the commencement of the case and to proceeds,
product,- offspring, or profits of such property, then such security
interest extends to such proceeds, product, offspring, or profits
acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the extent
provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy
law ....
(2) ...[I]f the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement
before the commencement of the case and if the security interest
created by such security agreement extends to property of the debtor
acquired before the commencement of the case and to amounts paid as
rents of such property ... , then such security interest extends to such
rents ... acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to
the extent provided in such security agreement ....
Section 552(b) adopts into bankruptcy law an important normative
assumption about the underlying bargain of the reasonable debtor
and creditor. Reasonable parties would not expect that the debtor
could freely exhaust the value of the collateral by consuming its
productive capacity in complete disregard of the secured party's
interest. When the Debtor takes, sells, leases, distributes, destroys,
foregoes, or otherwise consumes some or all of the collateral or its
productive capacity, Section 552(b) takes whatever assets the debtor
receives in return and treats them as substitute collateral. 1 9 In this
fashion, bankruptcy law respects the secured party's economic
interest in the collateral.
Within the U.C.C.'s present framework, Section 9-306's proceeds
coverage provides the logical conceptual mechanism for dealing with
Properly
the exhaustion of collateral's productive capacity.
characterized, proceeds of collateral include whatever assets the debtor
receives as a consequence of the consumption of that collateral's future
218. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 214, 108 Stat. 4106,
4126 (1994) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)).
219. Ma
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productive capacity. Such a definition would provide a coherent and
unitary framework for classifying proceeds in a manner consistent with
the ex ante bargain of the reasonable debtor and secured party.
Consider the following examples:
e Cleary Brothers acquires a crane. If Cleary Brothers sells the crane
to X and passes-to X both title and the crane's entire future productive
capacity, X's purchase price constitutes proceeds of the crane. If a
tornado wrecks the crane (destroying its productive capacity and thus
rendering title valueless as an economic matter) and Cleary Brothers
collects insurance, that insurance constitutes proceeds of the crane. If
Cleary Brothers leases the crane to X, thereby passing to X some or all
of the crane's future productive capacity, then the rent payments
constitute proceeds.220
• Hastie acquires 248 shares of FirstBank stock. If FirstBank
repurchases 10 shares from Hastie for $6.20 per share, the $62
repurchase price constitutes proceeds of the shares. This would remain
true even if Hastie paid only $1 per share for the stock, as the
intervening share price appreciation is part of the stock's productive
capacity. Likewise, if FirstBank declares a dividend of 25 cents per
share, the $62 cash dividend represents the stock's productive capacity
and thus constitutes proceeds of the stock. 221
* The Schmalings are farmers. One of their assets is the crop that they
have the right to plant during 1994. The Schmalings can take the right
to grow and harvest a crop and use that ungrown crop as collateral for
a loan from FirstBank. If the Schmalings plant and harvest a bumper
crop and sell that crop for cash, the cash represents the productive
capacity of the crop and constitutes proceeds of the crop.
Alternatively, the Schmalings can transfer their right to plant to a third
person (USDA) in exchange for a PIK payment. If the Schmalings
take the right to grow and harvest this crop and use that right to acquire
a PIK benefit, that PIK benefit reflects the productive capacity of the
crop rights that the Schmalings pledged to FirstBank, and thus
constitutes proceeds of the ungrown crop.222
C.

The Logical Limit of ContinuingProceeds Coverage

At first blush, one might attempt to criticize this unitary
conception of proceeds by suggesting that under such a conception,
220. See suprapart II.B.1-2; infra app., at cmt. 2, ex. 1-2.
221. See supra part II.C.1; infra app., at cmt. 2, ex. 4.
222. See supra part m.B.1; infra app., at cmt. 2, ex. 6.
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everything becomes proceeds. The PEB Report implicitly made this
same criticism in attempting to define the logical limit of the term
"proceeds":
At some point, the acquisition of assets by a debtor, in part as a
result of a diminution in value of collateral, will be too attenuated for
those assets to be considered proceeds. For example, accounts
generated by a construction contractor should not be considered
proceeds of the contractor's construction equipment, even though the
equipment depreciates as a result of its use in generating the accounts.
Nor should inventory fabricated by a debtor's factory equipment be
considered proceeds of that equipment. Cash earned from music or
video machines presents a case closer to the margin. Has the
equipment merely provided a service, or is the better analogy that of a
short-term rental? The Committee is inclined to leave such marginal
cases to the courts.223
This attempted limitation on the scope of the term "proceeds" is not
surprising, as it is fully consistent with earlier statements by the PEB
and by leading Article 9 commentators.2 24
The PEB Report's attempted limitation on the scope of the term
"proceeds" misses the mark, however, for two reasons. First, the PEB
Report fails to explain as an economic matter how these derivative
assets are functionally different from other derivative assets, such as
sale proceeds and lease rentals, that clearly constitute proceeds.
Second, the PEB Report confuses the question of whether to classify
an asset as proceeds with the question of whether the security interest
continues in that asset.
1.

The Functional Similarity of Derivative Assets

One can see the error of the PEB Report by considering the
very examples it used to attempt to limit the term "proceeds." For
example, consider the PEB Report's construction contractor
223. PEB REPORT, supranote 15, at 111 n.16.
224. See generally PEB COMMENARY No. 9, supra note 86 (asserting that while
lease payments constitute proceeds of leased equipment, "income generated from the
debtor's own use and possession of goods should [not] constitute proceeds of a secured
party's pre-existing collateral consisting of the goods"); see also BA-KLEY C.ARK, TIM LAW
OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE I 6.04[2][d], at 6-78
(1993) ("[I]ncome generated from the debtor's own use of the equipment should not qualify
as proceeds, because there has been no 'disposition' of the equipment except in the broad
sense of depreciation.").
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hypothetical.
The contractor can use its equipment to generate
rights to payment in several different ways. The contractor can use
the equipment by selling it for cash to a third party; alternatively, the
contractor can use the equipment by leasing it to a third party. In
each case, the use takes some or all of the equipment's productive
capacity and exhausts that capacity by devoting it to the benefit of a
third party. Accordingly, each corresponding right to payment is an
asset that derives from the equipment. Further, there is no functional
basis in an economic sense for treating the "sale" moneys as
proceeds and the "lease" moneys as nonproceeds. Substantively,
each represents a return upon some portion of the equipment's
productive capacity. The two situations merely reflect different
forms through which the contractor may capture the economic value
of the equipment. 2 6
Likewise, the contractor can use the equipment by leasing it to a
third party to use on other jobs, or by using the equipment on its own
jobs to produce accounts. In either case, the contractor's use takes
some or all of the equipment's productive capacity and exhausts that
capacity by devoting it to the benefit of a third party. As a result, each
corresponding right to payment from the third party is an asset that
derives from the equipment. Again, there exists no functional basis in
an economic sense for treating the rents as proceeds and the accounts
as nonproceeds. Substantively, these situations merely reflect different
forms through which the contractor may capture the economic value of
the equipment. Functionally, then, both the accounts and the lease
rentals should constitute proceeds of the equipment within the
economic, value-based conception of the term.227
The PEB Report is no more persuasive in its video machine
hypothetical z' As suggested above, there exists no functional basis
225. PEB REPORT, supranote 15, at 111 n.16.
226. Freyermuth, supra note 217, at 1532-35.
227. One can analyze the PEB Report's inventory hypothetical in a similar fashion.
The debtor can recover the economic value of its equipment by using that equipment to
produce inventory or by selling it to a third party who will use it to produce inventory. In
each case, the use consumes a portion of the equipment's productive capacity in the hands of
the debtor. Thus, the assets received by the debtor as a consequence of each form of use
clearly are derivative of the equipment, and clearly fall within the economic, value-based
conception of the term "proceeds." In an economic sense, the inventory generated by the
equipment is as much proceeds of the equipment as the rentals that the equipment would
generate if leased.
228. PEB REPORT, supranote 15, at 111 n.16.
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for distinguishing cash generated through the sale of collateral from
cash generated through its "use." 229 When the debtor acquires a video
game, it acquires title to that machine and the machine's future
productive capacity, the stream of cash receipts paid by users of the
machine. The debtor might lease the machine to a user for a term, or
might instead retain possession of the machine and make it available
to invitees or licensees. In either case, the assets received by the debtor
in exchange for that use are derivative of the machine; those assets
equally constitute the fruits of the machine's productive capacity. As
such, those sums properly constitute proceeds of the machine.3"
2.

"Identifiability" as the Logical Limit of Proceeds Coverage
a.

The Proper Interaction of Sections 9-306(1) and 9-306(2)

The hypotheticals that the PEB Report uses to try to limit the
scope of the term "proceeds" demonstrate a clear result orientation.
The PEB Report assumes the correct result-that the secured party
in the construction contractor hypothetical should not have a
continuing security interest against the contractor's accounts. The

229. See supra part II.B.2.
230. The only reported decision addressing the classification of cash produced by
video machines is In re S & J Holding Corp., 42 B.R. 249 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984). The S &
J Holding Corp. court refused to construe § 9-306(1) to include the cash produced by the
debtor's video games because, like construction equipment, the cash is generated by the use
of the collateral, and not the disposition of it. Id. at 250.
The S & J Holding Corp. court's analysis provides a personality-based comparison to
the current judicial debate concerning whether hotel room revenues are different from
apartment rents and revenues of other tenant-based commercial real estate projects. Many
bankruptcy courts have distinguished between hotels and apartments, concluding that
apartments generate rents (real property collateral) while hotels do not because hotel guests
are not tenants. See, e.g., Freyermuth, supra note 217, at 1467-76 (analyzing cases in this
area). I have argued elsewhere that this distinction is legally and commercially unjustifiable,
as the distinction between tenants and licensees has no necessary legal or functional
consequence for how security law classifies occupancy fees when those fees are assigned as
collateral. Id. at 1476-1512.
The S & J Holding Corp. court's analysis suffers from comparably unjustifiable
formalism. The difference in the quantum of rights possessed by the lessee user of the video
machine and the invitee or licensee user of the video machine has no necessary legal or
functional consequence for how security law classifies the cash that each user pays for its
quantum of rights. In each case, that cash reflects the fruits of the video machine's
productive capacity. Just as apartment rents and hotel room revenues properly constitute
proceeds of the land, id. at 1532-35, video machine income properly constitutes proceeds of
the machine.
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PEB Report then chooses the most apparent solution that achieves
that result-treating the contractor's accounts as nonproceeds.
The PEB Report errs, however, because it fails to recognize that
the present language of the U.C.C. already achieves this result without
placing a formalistic and commercially unjustified limitation upon the
scope of the term "proceeds." In attempting to limit the scope of the
term, the PEB Report confuses two unrelated questions: first, whether
to classify an asset as proceeds and second, whether the security
interest continues in that asset. As Section 9-306(2) makes clear,
these are separate inquiries.23' The fact that an asset constitutes
proceeds of collateral does not mean that the secured party
automatically takes a continuing security interest in that asset.
Depending upon the circumstances, an asset may constitute proceeds
of collateral within the economic, value-based conception of that term,
and yet a security interest will not continue in that asset because the
asset is not identifiable proceeds of the collateral under Section 932
306(2).2
One can see the coherent interaction of Section 9-306(1) and
Section 9-306(2) by again considering the hypotheticals from the PEB
Report. As demonstrated above, 3 the contractor's accounts properly
constitute proceeds of the equipment under Section 9-306(1), just as
lease rentals would also constitute proceeds of the equipment if the
contractor leased the equipment to a third party. Both the accounts and
the lease rentals would be assets that are derivative of the equipment,
functionally comparable to each other in an economic sense.
Therefore, Section 9-306(1) should not distinguish them.
Section 9-306(2), however, should distinguish them. While the
secured party would have a continuing security interest in the lease
rentals, the secured party would have no continuing security interest
in the accounts under Section 9-306(2). When the contractor uses the
equipment by leasing it to a third party, there is no substantial question
about the secured party's continuing interest in the lease rentals, which
231. See UC.C. § 9-306(2) (1990) ("[A] security interest continues in ... any
identifiableproceeds ..... (emphasis added)).
232. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1990) ("Except where this Article otherwise provides, a
security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition
thereof... and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by
the debtor." (emphasis added)).
233. See supranotes 225-227 and accompanying text.
234. See supranotes 73-86 and accompanying text.
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can be identified precisely to the lease of the equipment. When the
contractor uses the equipment to generate accounts on its own jobs,
however, the accounts are proceeds but cannot be identified precisely
to the equipment. While the accounts are proceeds of the equipment,
at a minimum they are also proceeds of any materials the contractor
used on the job and the contractor's labor and expertise. Since the
accounts are not identifiable precisely to the equipment, the secured
party's lien should not extend to the accounts under Section 9306(2).235
b.

A Final Aside: The Logical Limit of the Identifiability
Principle

At first blush, one might criticize as unrealistic this Article's
assertion that the lease rentals in the PEB Report contractor
hypothetical are identifiable precisely to the equipment. One might
argue that these lease rentals are also received on account of other
"services" provided by the contractor. These might include, inter
alia: (a) the time and expertise of the debtor's customer service
employee who leased the equipment to the customer; (b) the
235. A recent bankruptcy decision, In re Northeastern Copy Servs., Inc., 175 B.R.
580 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994), provides another hypothetical to demonstrate the appropriate
relationship between Section 9-306(1) and Section 9-306(2). In Northeastern, a creditor
held a security interest in all of the equipment, machinery, and inventory of the debtor,
which ran a copying service. Following the debtor's bankruptcy, the debtor generated over
$20,000 in gross revenues each month on account of providing copy services to its
customers. Northeastern, 175 B.R. at 582. The creditor argued that these revenues
constituted proceeds of its collateral and asked the court to enjoin the debtor from using
these revenues without providing adequate protection of the creditor's interest. Id. The
court rejected the creditor's request, holding that "the cash generated by [the debtor's]
performance of posptpetition copy services are clearly not 'proceeds' of the debtor's
equipment, machinery, and inventory. Id at 583.
By following the logic expressed in the PEB Report,the Northeasterndecision falls to
appreciate the true nature of this debtor's gross revenues and the proper relationship
between Section 9-306(1) and Section 9-306(2). Properly understood, revenues for postpetition copy services are proceeds of the debtor's equipment, machinery, and inventory;
these revenues reflect the economic value of the debtor's copy machines, toner, and paper
consumed through providing services to consumers. Thus, the post petition revenues should
constitute proceeds of the collateral under Section 9-306(1). The creditor should not receive
a continuing lien upon these revenues. A significant portion of the debtor's post-petition
services (and revenues paid for those services) involves the debtor's labor rather than its
equipment, machinery, and inventory. Since the creditor cannot identify the post-petition
revenues precisely to its own collateral alone, the creditor should not receive a continuing
lien upon those revenues under Section 9-306(2). Like the PEB Report, the Northeastern
decision thus reaches the right result for the wrong reason.
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electricity, water, and other utilities that the debtor uses to keep its
equipment leasing business open to the public; (c) the time and
expertise of the debtor's employee mechanic who services the
equipment before it is leased; or (d) any materials consumed in
servicing that equipment before it is leased.
In a pure economic sense, this criticism is correct. Some portion
of the lessee's rental payments-a very small portion, perhaps, but
some portion nonetheless-is properly allocable to the contractor's
services as distinct from the equipment itself. One might call this the
"equipment/services" distinction: the lessee of equipment is paying
both for the equipment and for the services of the lessor in providing
that equipment for lease. Thus, in pure economic terms, one might
properly question whether the lease rental is identifiable precisely to
the equipment.
Analogy to real estate finance law, however, demonstrates that
this criticism does not foreclose the use of the identifiability principle
as the key to establishing the limit of continuing proceeds coverage
under Section 9-306. The equipment/services distinction is similar in
character to the "land/services" distinction seen in real estate finance
law. Under the common law conception of rent, sums payable by an
occupier of land in exchange for the use of the land are classified as
"rent" (in the nature of realty), while sums allocable to the landowner's
personal services are not properly classified as rent. 6 If real estate
finance law took the land/services distinction seriously, it would take
every lease rental payment-part of which is properly allocable to use
of the land, and part of which is properly allocable to the developer's
services-and allocate that payment into its land (rent) and services
(nonrent) components."
I
In fact, however, real estate finance law does not take the
land/services distinction seriously. Land security law does not allocate
the tenant's lease payment into its land and services components. 38
236. See Freyermuth, supranote 217, at 1515-17.
237. See id. at 1519-20.
238. Several practical obstacles explain why most courts have rejected the
land/services distinction altogether in the landlord-tenant context:
The first obstacle concerns the tracking of historical cost data. Even if one
assumes that all occupiers equally value the importance of services to their
bargains, requiring a land/services allocation would require parties to compile and
analyze historical information concerning the developer's capital and operational
costs in order to allocate revenue properly into its rent/nonrent components.
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Instead, land security law chooses to allocate 100 percent of the
tenant's contractual obligation to land, thus treating the land as the
predominant aspect of the exchange. 23 9 Accordingly, land security law
treats 100 percent of the tenant's obligation as rent, even though some
portion of that obligation is economically allocable to services.
Likewise, the U.C.C. ought not take the equipment/services distinction
seriously in the equipment leasing hypothetical. In addition to the
expense and uncertainty associated with making such allocations,
requiring the maintenance of this distinction would be inconsistent
with the behavior of the lessor and lessee, who typically do not
separate the lessee's payment obligation into a use component and a
services component.2
Instead, security law should focus upon whether the user receives
a legally protectible right of use in the equipment itself--one that a
court would protect by granting damages or specific performance. In
the equipment leasing hypothetical, the lessee receives a legally
protectible right of use in the equipment in exchange for agreeing to
make a rental payment. Rather than allocate that payinent between
equipment and services, security law should simply deem that
payment to be allocated entirely to the equipment. Accordingly, the
lease rental would be identifiable precisely to the equipment, and
would therefore constitute identifiable proceeds of the equipment
under Section 9-306(2).241

Complying with this requirement would involve time and expense, with nothing
gained save the integrity of the common law's conception of rent as issuing
directly from the land. The second and larger obstacle is that all occupiers of a
project are not alike. The extent to which different occupiers are concerned about
"mere occupation of space" as opposed to "personal services" is a function of
each occupier's respective preferences. As an empirical matter, these preferences
may be impossible to measure accurately (and may change over time), thus
rendering the correctness of any particular allocation open to question.
Id at 1520.
Most significantly, requiring an allocation would be artificial given the contractual
behavior of owners and occupiers of commercial real estate. In making an occupancy
agreement such as a lease, the owner and the occupier typically do not separate the
occupier's payment obligation into a "use" component and a "services" component; rather,
the occupier agrees to make one payment in exchange for all benefits received. IaR at 152021.
239. Id. at 1522.
240. See supra note 238.
241. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1990).
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The Benefits of Identifiability as the Key to Continuing
Proceeds Coverage

In addition to according the term "proceeds" a unitary, coherent
scope, there are two additional justifications for recognizing and
treating "identifiability" as the key to establishing the logical limit of
proceeds coverage under Section 9-306(2). First, Section 9-306(2)'s
limitation of proceeds coverage to "identifiable" proceeds achieves a
result that roughly yet accurately reflects the expected ex ante bargain
of the reasonable debtor and secured party. Again, this becomes
apparent when one considers the PEB Report's. contractor
hypothetical. 242 If the contractor grants the secured party an interest
only in its equipment, a reasonable third person looking at the security
agreement would extrapolate the following ex ante bargain:
* On the one hand, if the contractor uses the equipment by selling it or
leasing it to third parties for their consumption, one would expect
reasonable persons in the positions of the debtor and secured party to
understand that the secured party's lien would continue against the
sale/lease payments. Since those payments are traceable only to the
equipment, one cannot confuse them with other inputs over which the
parties do not appear to have bargained in the security agreement.
Thus, one can conclude that the parties understand that those payments
would stand in place of the collateral.
e On the other hand, if the contractor uses the equipment to generate
accounts on its own construction jobs, no reasonable person in the
position of the secured party could expect its lien to continue against
those accounts. The accounts do not flow solely from the equipment,
but also from other inputs (labor, raw materials, etc.) over which the
parties do not appear to have bargained. Thus, one cannot conclude
that the parties would understand that those accounts would stand in
place of the collateral. The parties' failure to anticipate and deal with
the tracing problem, which they might have done by including
accounts as part of the collateral, reflects their apparent understanding
that the secured party should have no continuing lien upon the debtor's
accounts.

In contrast, if the contractor granted the secured party an interest in
both equipment and accounts, one would look at the security
agreement and extrapolate a different bargain.
This security
agreement, which expressly describes both the original collateral and
242. See PEB REPoRT, supranote 15, at 111 n.16.
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what it produces, manifests the parties' mutual understanding that
the secured party is to have a lien upon the accounts even though
they are not identifiable proceeds of the equipment automatically
covered by Section 9-306(2).243
Second, focusing upon Section 9-306(2)'s identifiability
requirement as the appropriate logical limit of proceeds coverage will
result in more coherent judicial decision-making than exists at present,
when courts focus purely upon the interpretation of the statutory term
"proceeds" under Section 9-306(1).244 If the Drafting Committee
adopts the economic, value-based conception of proceeds advocated
here, one can expect a drastic reduction in litigation over the legal
issue of the scope of the term "proceeds" under Section 9-306(1).
Thereafter, proceeds litigation would instead focus upon a factual
issue that should be relatively easy to determine: whether the proceeds
were identifiable under Section 9-306(2). In contrast, if the Drafting
Committee duplicates the error of the PEB Report and places a
conceptually unjustified restriction on the definition of "proceeds," one
can expect continued litigation over the legal issue of the scope of the
term "proceeds." By articulating a conception of proceeds that is
internally incoherent, the Drafting Committee would send a signal to
courts that the term "proceeds" is nebulous enough as a matter of law
to justify any particular result. Given the historical frequency with
243. The PEB Report's inventory fabricator example can be analyzed in a similar
fashion. Id. If the debtor leased the equipment to a third party, the secured party would
obtain a continuing security interest in the rent payments, which are identifiable precisely to
the lease. If the debtor uses the equipment to fabricate its own inventory, however, that
inventory is not identifiable precisely to the equipment. At a minimum, the inventory is also
identifiable to the debtor's raw materials and labor.
Thus, if the debtor had granted the secured party an interest only in its equipment, the
expected ex ante bargain of the hypothetical reasonable debtor and secured party is clear.
One looking at such a security agreement would conclude that the parties understood that
the secured party would have no lien against the inventory, which represents a return upon
other inputs over which the parties do not appear to have bargained. Therefore, the secured
party would not receive a security interest in the inventory under § 9-306.
The PEB Report's video machine example likewise poses no problems under § 9306(2). Cash generated by use of a video machine would be identifiable precisely to the
machine; thus, the secured party's lien upon the machine would continue into the cash
proceeds under § 9-306(2). A different result would follow, however, if the collateral were a
vending machine. In that case, cash generated by the machine would not be identifiable
precisely to the machine, but also to the items distributed by the machine. As a result, a
secured party with a lien solely upon the vending machine would have no continuing lien
upon the cash generated from that machine.
244. See supranotes 1-14 and accompanying text.
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which courts have used formalistic interpretations of Section 9-306 to
reach particular results,245 that would be a poor message to send.
V.

CoNCLusION: A PROPOSAL FOR REvIsING SEcION 9-306 AND

ACCOMPANYING COMMENTARY
The conception of proceeds presented in this Article is the only
conception that is sufficiently coherent to rescue the term from the
morass of ambiguity caused by judicial decisions focusing upon the
passage of title and nonexistent collateral distracters. To give the
term "proceeds" a coherent, functional meaning, one must define
that term to include all assets received upon the occurrence of events
that exhaust the collateral's economic value or productive capacity.
At the same time, Article 9 should extend continuing proceeds
coverage no further than those proceeds that are identifiable
precisely to the secured party's collateral. This conception of the
term "proceeds" most closely approximates the expected ex ante
bargain of the reasonable debtor and secured party, and thus should
form the basis for any revision of Section 9-306.
As the Drafting Committee undertakes revision of Section 9-306,
it should remember the lessons taught by the past thirty years of
judicial interpretation of Section 9-306. When combined with the
U.C.C.'s rules of construction, the language of the current Section 9306(1) is sufficient to give the term "proceeds" the economic, valuebased meaning advocated in this Article. Nevertheless, courts
repeatedly have demonstrated either the incapacity or unwillingness to
interpret Section 9-306(1) broadly and consistently with this emerging,
economic conception of the term "proceeds." Because Section 9-306
has always left unspoken the policies underlying this conception,
courts have tended to interpret Section 9-306(1) narrowly, forgetting
that Section 9-306 is part of a uniform code of commercial law
intended to "make distinctions, where distinctions are necessary, along
functional rather than formal lines." 246 In revising Section 9-306(1),
the Drafting Committee must consider the possibility that the morass
of conflicting proceeds decisions resulted from a definition of
proceeds that was too subtle and left too much unsaid.

245. See supra part lI.B.
246. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1990).
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Furthermore, the Drafting Committee should take care not to
*enact a mere ad hoe revision that overrules aberrant decisions such as
Hastie,Schmaling, and Kroehler Cabinetwithout overtly articulating a
coherent conception of the term "proceeds." Such an ad hoc approach
would repeat the mistake of the drafters in the 1972 revision
concerning casualty insurance payments. In that revision, the drafters
added specific language that reversed the "casualty insurance
payments are not proceeds" cases. 247 The amending language,
however, left unspoken the revision's true rationale-that casualty
insurance payments were a substitute for the collateral's economic
value and thus properly constituted proceeds of the collateral. At the
time, commentators criticized the amendment on this basis, arguing
that it should have addressed whether proceeds included similar assets
such as tort claims. 48 Subsequent history proves that these criticisms
were justified. As Parts I and III of this Article demonstrate, the
drafters' refusal to articulate overtly the economic underpinnings of
the term "proceeds" resulted in an abundance of conflicting decisions
and greater ambiguity over the true scope of the term.
To prevent further confusion and inconsistency in judicial
interpretation, the Drafting Committee should revise Section 9-306
and its commentary in a manner that leaves no question about the
proper scope of the term "proceeds." The following Appendix
contains proposed statutory language and commentary for Section 9306 that would codify effectively both the proper scope of the term
"proceeds" and the appropriate logical limit of the secured party's
continuing coverage against proceeds. 24 9 This proposed statutory
247. See supranote 74 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Henry J. Boroff, Insurance Proceeds Under Section 9-306: Before and
After, 79 COM. LJ. 442, 443-45 (1974); Hawkland, supra note 4, at 12-13. At the time,
Boroff presciently noted that the amendment's ambiguity would lead to uncertainty and
formalistic judicial interpretation with reliance on the common law. Boroff, supra, at 44445.
Given this history, one can sincerely question the PEB Report's apparent willingness to
"leave ... marginal cases to the courts." PEB REPORT, supra note 15, at 111 n.16. Unless
the revision produces a coherent, functional conception of the term "proceeds" and strong
interpretive directions, then leaving marginal cases to the courts can be expected to result in
business as usual in the bankruptcy courts-wildly divergent results and no predictability in
§ 9-306's interpretation.
249. The suggested statutory text and commentary in the Appendix addresses only the
changes necessary in the current U.C.C. §§ 9-306(1) and 9-306(2), such as proper
classification of an asset as proceeds and the continuation of the secured party's interest in
the original collateral and identifiable proceeds. Other issues covered by the current version
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language and commentary forms an appropriate basis for the Drafting
Committee's consideration as it undertakes revision of Section 9-306.

of § 9-306, such as perfection of a security interest in proceeds and whether § 9-306(2)
should incorporate the "lowest intermediate balance rule" for tracing proceeds, are beyond
the scope of this Article. For the PEB Report's recommendations on these and other issues
concerning § 9-306, see PEB REPORT, supranote 15, at 112-34.
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APPENDIX
Proposed Statutory Language

§ 9-306. "PRoEs"; SECURED PARTY'S RIGHTS ON DIsPosiTIoN OF
COLLATERAL
(1) "Proceeds" includes, but is not limited to
(a) whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection, or
other disposition of collateral or proceeds; and
(b) any rents, profits, products or offspring of collateral or
proceeds.
For purposes of this section, "other disposition" includes any act or
event that damages the collateral or reduces its value, even if the
debtor retains title to the collateral. Money, checks, deposit accounts,
and the like are "cash proceeds." All other proceeds are "non-cash
proceeds."
(2) Except where this Article or the security agreement
otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral
notwithstanding sale, exchange, or other disposition thereof unless the
disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable
proceeds including collections.
OFFICIAL COMMEM

1. This section states a secured party's right to the proceeds
received by a debtor on disposition of collateral and states when his
interest in such proceeds is perfected. As provided in Section 9203(3), a secured party's claim to proceeds under this section does not
require a statement in the security agreement; it is assumed that the
parties intend for the secured party to retain an interest in proceeds of
the collateral unless the parties agree otherwise. Subsection (2) thus
carries out the presumed intention of the parties that the secured party
should obtain a continuing security interest against proceeds of the
collateral as long as the proceeds are identifiable precisely to the
collateral.
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2. Subsection (1) provides a functional definition of the term
"proceeds" that focuses upon economics. Properly understood,
"proceeds" includes any asset received upon the occurrence of some
event that consumes or exhausts some or all of the economic value or
the productive capacity of the secured party's bargained-for collateral.
Prior to this amendment, subsection (1) provided that "proceeds"
included "whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection, or
other disposition of collateral or proceeds." Had courts interpreted the
prior definition broadly as directed by the rules of construction set
forth in Section 1-102, amendment to Subsection (1) might have been
avoided. Many courts, however, construed the prior definition
narrowly, concluding that an asset could not constitute "proceeds"
unless the debtor permanently had transferred title to the collateral.
See, e.g., In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that cash
dividends are not proceeds of stock); In re Cleary Bros. Constr. Co., 9
B.R. 40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that equipment lease rentals
are not proceeds of equipment);
By construing the prior definition of "proceeds" narrowly and in
a formalistic fashion, courts tended to reach results contrary to the
presumed bargain of the reasonable debtor and secured party. As
amended, subsection (1) expressly rejects the notion that passage of
title to collateral is relevant to or determinative of the proper
characterization of an asset as "proceeds." Instead, the definition in
subsection (1) focuses squarely upon economics-any asset derived
from the consumption or exhaustion of some portion of the collateral's
economic value or productive capacity is "proc6eds."
The operation of this subsection is illustrated by the following
examples:
EXAMPLE 1. A obtains a duly perfected security interest in B's
machine, which is insured against casualty by C. B's machine is
destroyed, and C pays $500 to B pursuant to its obligations under the
terms of the casualty policy. The $500 is a substitute for the economic
value of the collateral that was consumed by the casualty.
Accordingly, the $500 constitutes proceeds of the machine.
ExAMPLE 2. A obtains a duly perfected security interest in B's
machine. B leases the machine to C for one year at a rental of
$500/month. B's action of leasing the machine to C has the effect of
consuming a portion of the machine's productive capacity; the
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$500/month rental is a substitute that B receives for transferring the
machine's productive capacity to C. Accordingly, the $500/month
rental constitutes proceeds of the machine.
EXAMPLE 3. A obtains a duly perfected security interest in B's
machine. B's machine is destroyed by the negligent actions of C. B
sues C in tort and C agrees to pay B $500 in settlement of B's claim.
The $500 is a substitute for the economic value of the collateral that
was consumed by Cs negligent action. Accordingly, the $500
constitutes proceeds of the machine.
EXAMPLE 4. A obtains a duly perfected security interest in 50
shares of ABC Co. stock owned by B. ABC Co. declares and pays a
cash dividend of $1/share. The $50 received by B represents a return
upon the productive capacity of the 50 shares of stock pledged to A as
collateral. Accordingly, the $50 cash dividend constitutes proceeds of
the stock.
EXAMPLE 5. A obtains a duly perfected security interest in data
processing software written by B. B grants to C a nonexclusive site
license for the software for a one-time fee of $500. The $500 received
by B represents a return upon the productive capacity of the software
pledged to A as collateral. Accordingly, the $500 constitutes proceeds
of the software.
EXAMPLE 6. B grants A a security interest in her yet-to-be-planted
alfalfa crop. A files a financing statement in all offices required by
Section 9-401 to perfect that security interest. Before planting her
alfalfa crop, B contracts for and receives a $20,000 agricultural subsidy
payment from a government agricultural agency in exchange for her
agreement not to plant alfalfa. The $20,000 is a substitute for the
economic value of the crop that was expected to be grown pursuant to
the security agreement. Accordingly, the $20,000 agricultural subsidy
payment constitutes proceeds of B's crops even though such crops
were never planted.
ExAMPLE 7. A obtains a duly perfected security interest in all of
B's accounts and general intangibles, now existing and after-acquired.
B maintains a policy of business interruption insurance, issued by C,
that protects B's expected business income in the event of a business
interruption. An unexpected flood interrupts B's business for a period
of nine months. C pays $100,000 to B pursuant its obligations under
the terms of the business interruption policy. Assuming that the
$100,000 was calculated on the basis of the revenue lost by B because
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of the flood, the $100,000 is a substitute for the economic value of the
accounts and intangible rights that B would have generated absent the
flood. Accordingly, the $100,000 would constitute proceeds of B's
accounts and general intangibles.
Examples 6 and 7 demonstrate and reinforce that when
attempting to classify an asset as "proceeds," courts should look to the
understanding of the reasonable debtor and secured party as
manifested in the security agreement. Prior to this amendment, courts
often concluded that an asset could not constitute "proceeds" if the
bargained-for collateral never came into actual existence. See, e.g., In
re Schmaling, 783 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that federal
agricultural payment-in-kind subsidies are not proceeds of crop when
debtor never planted a crop); In re Kroehler Cabinet Co., 129 B.R. 191
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that business interruption insurance
payments are not proceeds of debtor's accounts; accounts never came
into existence due to interruption of business), rev'd sub nom., MNC
Commercial Corp. v. Rouse, No. 91-0615-CV-W-2, 1992 WL 674733
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 1992). Examples 5 and 6 reflect that as amended,
subsection (1) rejects these cases in favor of a definition that focuses
upon the apparent ex ante understanding of the reasonable debtor and
secured party.
3. While subsection (1)'s definition of "proceeds" is broad and allinclusive, subsection (2) states an affirmative limitation upon the
ability of the secured party to obtain continuing proceeds coverage
under this Section. Before a secured party may obtain a continuing
interest upon proceeds, the secured party must demonstrate that those
proceeds are identifiable precisely to the collateral. The identifiability
requirement enables this Section to achieve a result that roughly yet
accurately reflects the expected understanding of the reasonable debtor
and secured party. When an asset constitutes proceeds under
subsection (1) and is identifiable precisely to the collateral, a
reasonable debtor and secured party would expect that the secured
party would retain an interest upon the proceeds. When an asset
constitutes proceeds under subsection (1), but cannot be identifiable
precisely to the collateral, a reasonable secured party could not expect
to retain a security interest upon the proceeds solely by virtue of this
Section.
The operation of this Section is further illustrated by the
following examples:
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EXAMPLE 8. A obtains a duly perfected security interest in B's

machine. B leases the machine to C for one year at a rental of
$500/month. As shown in example 2 above, the $500/month rental
constitutes proceeds of the machine. Since the $500/month rental is
identifiable precisely to machine, A obtains a continuing security
interest upon the $500/month rental under subsection (2)..
EXAMPLE 9. A obtains a duly perfected security interest upon B's
equipment. B uses the equipment and other raw materials to fabricate
inventory. The inventory is received by B as the end product of an
event that consumes a portion of the equipment's productive capacity.
Accordingly, the inventory constitutes proceeds of the equipment
under the broad definition established in subsection (1). The inventory
is not identifiable precisely to the equipment, however, as it is also a
product of the debtor's raw materials and the debtor's labor, neither of
which constitute a portion of the bargained-for collateral. Accordingly,
even though the inventory may constitute proceeds of the equipment,
A does not obtain a continuing security interest against the equipment
under subsection (2).
EXAMPLE 10. A obtains a duly perfected security interest upon
B's dairy cattle. B chooses to abandon its dairy business and accepts a
$150,000 subsidy payment under a government-sponsored dairy
termination program. Assume that a portion of the $150,000 reflects
the slaughter value of the dairy cattle, while the remainder reflects the
goodwill and going concern value of B's dairy business. If A can
demonstrate precisely the portion of the subsidy payment that is
allocable to the cattle, that portion of the subsidy payment constitutes
identifiable proceeds of the cattle against which A obtains a continuing
security interest under subsection (2). If A cannot demonstrate
precisely the portion of the subsidy payment that is allocable to the
cattle, then even though some portion of that subsidy payment may
constitute proceeds of the collateral, A would not receive a continuing
security interest against any portion of the subsidy payment under
subsection (2).
Example 10 demonstrates that subsection (2) places the burden of
proof of identifiability upon the secured party.
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